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Cybersecurity Spillovers
Mark Verstraete & Tal Zarsky†
This Article identifies and analyzes a previously
unrecognized source of positive externalities within
cybersecurity, which we term “cybersecurity spillovers.” Most
commentators have focused on negative externalities and market
failures, leading to a pervasive pessimism about the possibility of
adequate cybersecurity protections. In response, this Article
demonstrates that unique dynamics from the world of cloud
computing—most notably, indivisibility—may force cloud service
firms to generate spillovers. These spillovers are additional security
protections provided to common cloud users: clients who may not
have been willing or able to acquire these security services
otherwise. Furthermore, this additional source of security offsets
some of the most pernicious effects of negative externalities and
market failure which commonly plague the cybersecurity ecosystem.
Alongside its descriptive analysis of cybersecurity spillovers,
this Article alerts policymakers about potential analytical tools
which can be used to identify the most beneficial spillovers.
Moreover, it offers recommendations for specific interventions
that will promote spillovers and improve the state of cybersecurity
generally. In particular, this Article explains that policymakers
could promote indivisibility and strengthen spillovers by tailoring
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liability rules. Such enhanced liability might incentivize premium
cloud service clients to demand robust protections across the
entire platform. In addition, the Article addresses the relationship
between market concentration and spillovers. It provides
recommendations for preserving spillovers even without
concentration in the market for cloud storage. And finally, the
Article suggests how the government’s cloud services
procurement and tender processes can be utilized to amplify the
beneficial effects of spillovers.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard view within cybersecurity is that data security
practices are woefully ineffective and fail to provide meaningful
protection. Empirical evidence largely supports this pervasive
cybersecurity pessimism. Public advocacy groups monitoring data
breaches estimate that there have been thousands of significant
breaches in the last decade, exposing billions of sensitive records.1
And further, the stakes of data security are on the rise as more
devices—including critical infrastructure—become internetconnected and potential targets for hacking.2 As it stands, the
frequency and devastation of data security incidents is unlikely to
abate without substantial regulatory intervention.3
Worse still, potential solutions to inadequate cybersecurity
are complicated and stymied by market failures that result from
negative externalities. More specifically, firms often fail to ensure
1. Davey Winder, Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records in First Six Months of 2019,
FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019, 6:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/
20/data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-in-first-six-months-of-2019/?sh=2c52be6abd54;
see also Meagan Leonhardt, The 10 Biggest Hacks of the Decade, CNBC (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/the-10-biggest-data-hacks-of-the-decade.html.
2. Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Internet of Things Connectivity Binge: What Are
the Implications? PEW RSCH CTR. (June 6, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2017/06/06/the-internet-of-things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the-implications/.
3. See generally Check Point Cybersecurity Report, CHECK POINT RSCH. (2020),
https://www.ntsc.org/assets/pdfs/cyber-security-report-2020.pdf (arguing that cybersecurity
exploits are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to defend); Herb Weisbaum, The Total
Cost of Data Breach—Including Lost Business—Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018, 1:15
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-includinglost-business-keeps-growing-n895826 (“The financial damage caused by a data breach has
spiked by more than 6 percent since last year and now costs companies an average of $3.86
million each, according to a new study.”).
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adequate data security because they do not bear the full cost
of breaches.4 Of course, companies actively protect their users and
themselves against security threats, but the costs incurred by a
single firm in the wake of data breach are significantly less than the
overall social cost of the same breach.5 This is largely because a
substantial portion of the cost of breach is borne by individuals or
companies unconnected to the breached firm.6 Taken together, the
persistence of data breaches coupled with market failures offer little
hope for more resilient cybersecurity protections.
This Article resists the tide of pessimism and argues that unique
dynamics within cloud computing systems may promote positive
externalities, or as we refer to them “cybersecurity spillovers.” This
dynamic is a product of the uneven terrain of internet
cybersecurity. Some industries provide greater security than
others—distinctions that appear relevant even across a single
platform or application. It should come as no surprise, then, that
cyberspace features islands of robust cybersecurity. What is
surprising, however, is that these islands are amenable to
predictable expansion that may be controlled and prioritized
through particular policy decisions. The expansion of security
islands extends additional security protections across various client
tiers, offsets potential market failures, and improves the state of
cybersecurity generally.
The defining feature of cybersecurity spillovers is that they
expand security protections and, by extension, protect users
who may lack sufficient security. As we detail, cybersecurity
spillovers are most likely to develop and resonate within a cloud
computing environment. Here, specific characteristics of this
growing industry create and spill additional protections into other
contexts, thus potentially neutralizing the effects of negative
4. Examining the Current Data Security and Breach Notification Regime: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 10
(2018) (statement of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Fellow, R Street Institute) (“Private sector
actors often do not internalize the costs of failures in a way that leads them to take adequate
protective steps. When software fails to prevent an intrusion or a software provider fails to
interdict a malware attack, the costs are borne entirely by the end users.”); see also Justin
(Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1511 (2017) (discussing how
incentives fail to guarantee adequate cybersecurity protections); Nathan Alexander Sales,
Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503 (2013).
5. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 10.
6. Id.
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externalities and remedying market failures. This Article
investigates the nature of these spillovers and, in particular,
examines the unique features of cybersecurity that enable these
additional protections as well as how spillovers influence the larger
pursuit of a secure cybersecurity ecosystem.
Cybersecurity spillovers result principally from two largely
overlooked features of cloud computing services: indivisibility and
diversity. Cloud services tend towards indivisibility. Rather than
partitioning the service, offering some users very basic levels of
security, cloud operators provide robust security protections to all
users. This indivisibility results from a variety of factors. At times,
it is a product of the feasibility of actually dividing the service,
which can be technically difficult and costly.7 However, it is also a
straightforward response to incentives. Even in cases where
partitioning is possible, the threat of legal and reputational liability
that arises from mistakenly storing secure data in less secure areas
of the service pushes firms toward adopting rigorous security
standards across the entire service.
However, indivisibility alone is insufficient to produce
meaningful cybersecurity spillovers. Security spillovers also
require that diverse clients with divergent security preferences
have their information hosted on the same cloud service.
Fortunately, cloud storage platforms often cater to diverse sets of
clients for two fundamental reasons. First, most cloud services are
public—rather than private—clouds, meaning that they are
available for anyone willing to pay.8 Second, there is significant
convergence in the global market for cloud storage. As it stands,
Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud
provide storage services for the majority of the global market.9
These two factors work in tandem to create a cloud storage
ecosystem where there are many different clients with different

7. See infra Section II.B.1
8. See What Are Public, Private, and Hybrid Clouds?, MICROSOFT AZURE ,
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-are-private-public-hybrid-clouds/
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (“Public clouds are the most common type of cloud
computing deployment.”).
9. Edward Jones, Cloud Market Share—A Look at the Cloud Ecosystem in 2021, KINSTA
(Sept. 8, 2021), https://kinsta.com/blog/cloud-market-share/ (noting that Amazon and
Microsoft alone control the majority of the market for cloud storage and, further, the top five
companies control about 80%).
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security requirements grouped on the same platform, leading to
spillovers between them.
Our analysis of fundamental concepts such as indivisibility,
diversity, and spillovers builds on earlier conceptual work and
brings additional nuance to these topics. These concepts have been
discussed in the context of cross-border influences, most recently
and notably by Anu Bradford in her analysis of the “Brussels
Effect.”10 This Article offers an innovative expansion of these ideas
to the data security market – a market with unique indivisibilities,
diversity, and market dynamics – which differs from other massmarket production schemes and the standards they entail.11
Moreover, this analysis also reveals intriguing similarities between
cybersecurity and other industries (such as food processing) and
identifies insights that can be appropriated from these facially
unrelated contexts. And further, our analysis illuminates novel
forms of externalities in cybersecurity that are principally focused
on various dynamics other than the fact that cybersecurity is a
public good.
Alongside our conceptual points, we offer several policy
recommendations for promoting spillovers in cases where their
existence and effects are unequivocally beneficial. Possible policy
measures include interventions that push premium clients of cloud
services to demand indivisibility, which generates security benefits
to all cloud users. Among other methods, this Article explains that
regulators could promote indivisibility by adopting strict liability
for breaches of select information (such as financial data) and
allowing high liquidated damages. In addition, spillovers could be
promoted by altering breach notification rules to encourage
premium clients to provide more harsh reputational sanctions
against cloud computing firms in the wake of a breach. This threat
of liability, coupled with additional reputational sanctioning,
would likely drive premium clients to pressure cloud storage
vendors to apply advanced security measures across the platform,
ensuring that all tiers have adequate security protections.
Another set of policy recommendations examines the
complicated relationship between concentration and security

10. ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSEL’S EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE
WORLD (2020).
11. See infra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.

934

935

Cybersecurity Spillovers

spillovers. Concentration in the market for cloud storage is partially
responsible for security spillovers because it leads to diversity
within these platforms.12 However, many commentators have
suggested that multinational information technology companies
(such as Amazon) who offer cloud storage services should be
the target of antitrust interventions that potentially break them
up.13 Rather than taking sides on this debate, we offer policy
responses that can preserve spillovers without market
concentration. More specifically, if cloud storage providers are
broken up, policymakers should ensure that cloud providers retain
a diverse set of clients based on both jurisdiction and security
preferences. This diversity allows users to receive additional
security benefits of strict legal jurisdictions (such as the European
Union) and security sensitive clients (such as the United States
federal government or financial institutions).
Finally, we detail how the governmental contracting process
may also be a tool to amplify data security spillovers.14 For
example, the government could strengthen spillovers by awarding
lucrative government contracts to cloud storage firms that have a
diverse set of clients. This would ensure that clients who otherwise
would have lacked sufficient data security would receive
additional protection. Such an outcome would follow from changes
that cloud computing firms would implement platform-wide to
ensure that they would qualify for governmental tender or comply
with and renew their lucrative procurement contract. Similarly, the
government could award contracts to multiple vendors rather than
a single one. This decision would improve knowledge resources
within several different companies, a move which would lead to
security benefits for a larger group of users.

12. See Edward Jones, supra note 9.
13. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017) (arguing
for scrutiny of Amazon’s potentially anticompetitive behavior); Steve Lohr, How Should
Big Tech Be Reined? Here Are 4 Prominent Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/technology/big-tech-reined-in.html.
14. Other commentators have recognized that procurement decisions are de facto
policy decisions that will promote certain social objectives often at the expense of other
objectives. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2019); Catherine
Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH L. REV. 1595 (2016); David S.
Rubenstein, Acquiring Ethical AI, 73 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2021).
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The rest of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I maps the
current state of cybersecurity. In particular, we examine the role of
externalities and explain the failures of the market to provide
adequate security protections.
Part II details the nature of spillovers generally and within
infrastructure. Moreover, this Part details how cloud storage
creates unique dynamics—most notably, indivisibility—that cause
additional security protections to migrate across platforms and
contexts. This theoretical discussion is followed by three examples
of cybersecurity spillovers that generate additional security
features within cloud storage services.
Part III examines cybersecurity spillovers against the backdrop
of a law and economic analysis of externalities. This inquiry
sketches three potential scenarios for how the cost of additional
security created by spillovers is distributed. In turn, we assess how
these different cost structures reshape our thinking of whether
these security spills are truly an externality, and under what
conditions they should be promoted.
Part IV builds on the earlier discussion and provides policy
recommendations that detail potential methods to enhance
spillovers. These prescriptions include various measures to promote
the indivisibility of the cloud computing platform as well as other
methods to preserve the benefits of market concentration without
the negative effects of concentration itself. And finally, this Article
concludes with some important directions for future research.
I. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS: THE STATE OF CYBERSECURITY AND
THE NATURE OF THE CLOUD
This Part details two important features of cybersecurity. First,
we examine the current failures of cybersecurity and explain why
market solutions have failed to provide robust solutions to these
problems. In particular, we examine the role of negative
externalities which undermine potential solutions for
cybersecurity’s shortcomings. Second, we detail the growing trend
toward outsourcing data storage, backup, and even processing to
remote locations in “the cloud.” We examine the recent turn to the
cloud and, in particular, catalogue the different types of cloud
storages systems and their relationship to security spillovers.
Importantly, we detail how “shard” models of cloud storage and
processing are particularly amenable to promoting spillover effects.
936
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A. Failures of Cybersecurity
It is broadly acknowledged that cybersecurity is a problem.15
Examples abound of large firms failing to provide adequate levels
of protection. For instance, Deloitte made international headlines
when the company failed to implement multi-factor authentication
on a server.16 This oversight exposed the private emails of roughly
350 clients including government departments within the United
States and multinational corporations.17 However, Deloitte is not
alone in failing to adequately protect against cybersecurity
vulnerabilities. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse—an organization
that tracks data breach incidents—estimates that there have been
over 9,000 public breaches since 2005, exposing more than 10 billion
records.18 Moreover, breach incidents are not costless—IBM
estimates that a single breach incident costs firms in the United
States over 9 million dollars.19
If one thing is clear, it is that the current regime—the market
coupled with unpredictable legal liability—fails to provide
adequate cybersecurity.20 First, and most notably, the private costs
to firms that follow from data breaches are often insufficient to
force firms to invest adequately in cybersecurity.21 This is largely

15. See, Andrey Evdokimov, What It Takes to Be a CISO: Success and Leadership in
Corporate IT Security, KASPERSKY DAILY (Oct. 25, 2018), https://usa.kaspersky.com/
blog/ciso-report/16480/25, 2018), https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/ciso-report/16480/
(claiming that many Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) consider breaches
inevitable or, rather, a question of “when” not “if”).
16. Nick Hopkins, Deloitte Hit by Cyber-Attack Revealing Clients’ Secret Emails,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/
25/deloitte-hit-by-cyber-attack-revealing-clients-secret-emails.
17. Id.
18. Daniel Funke, By the Numbers: How Common are Data Breaches—and What Can You
Do About Them? POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/sep/
23/numbers-how-common-are-data-breaches-and-what-can-/.
19. Cost of Data Breach Report 2021, IBM, at 0:33 (2021), https://www.ibm.com/
security/data-breach. Additional reports confirm the frequency of data breaches and the
damage that is created by them. Check Point Cybersecurity Report, CHECK POINT RSCH. 9–11
(2020), https://www.ntsc.org/assets/pdfs/cyber-security-report-2020.pdf.
20. For a review of market failures in cybersecurity generally and critical
infrastructure in particular, see Eldar Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure:
A Critical Analysis, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 515, 544 (2017).
21. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1004 (2018) (“Our
legal system has not yet created adequate incentives for individual companies to take the
necessary—and sometimes costly—steps to reduce the likelihood of cybersecurity attacks.”).
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because penalties for breaches are quite low.22 As a result, harms
stemming from security failings are not internalized by the firms
that produce these outcomes.23 As Jeff Kosseff explains, penalties—
in the form of fines, court awards, and other expenses—would
have to be increased significantly in order to properly incentivize
firms to take adequate precautions against cybersecurity
vulnerabilities.24 At bottom, the costs of a breach are significantly
less than the social cost that follow from a breach incident.25
Additionally, the market failure of security is compounded by
the necessity of proving harm in order to recover damages in
litigation. Individuals often face tangible, remediable harm in the
wake of security violations. Insufficient security leads to identity
theft and actual theft. However, individuals still face a hurdle of
proving that a specific security breach incident created those
harms.26 In a security ecosystem where there are many security
breaches, it becomes immensely difficult to prove that a specific
breach led to a specific, addressable harm.27 Interestingly, however,
the persistence of many security violations potentially creates the
disincentive to invest in heightened security measures. In other
words, if many firms suffer from security breaches, they are more
robustly shielded from liability because plaintiffs will struggle to
tie harms to any specific incident.
Finally, some economists have argued that the market is likely
to underproduce cybersecurity because of the inherent public good
22. Id. (explaining that breaches “cost less than one percent of the companies’ annual
revenues”) (citing Benjamin Dean, Why Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in
Cybersecurity, CONVERSATION (Mar. 4, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/whycompanies-have-little-incentive-to-invest-in-cybersecurity-37570.
23. See Kosseff, supra note 21, at 1004.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739, 773 (2018) (contending that an analysis of harm in data breach
litigation lawsuits has confounded courts and further arguing for a more capacious legally
cognizable definition of harm for these suits); see also Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus
Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 681–82 (2013) (discussing the problems of
proving causation with security harms, and the implications of this shortcoming).
27. Nicole Hong, For Consumers, Injury Is Hard to Prove in Data-Breach Cases, WALL ST.
J. (June 26, 2016, 8:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-consumers-injury-is-hard-toprove-in-data-breach-cases-1466985988; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Data Security
Harms, TECH. POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/August2014/Privacy-and-Data-Security-Harms.aspx (explaining that “it is very difficult to trace a
particular identify theft or fraud to any one particular data breach”).
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nature of security.28 That is, the security of the internet ecosystem
depends on decisions by all users.29 So, even if a specific provider
secures its service, decisions by other service providers to refrain
from securing their own sites and services diminishes the security
of the first provider as well.30 To demonstrate this dynamic and
concern, consider the nature of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks. These attacks require many compromised
computers to overwhelm the targeted service.31 Here, the
effectiveness of the attack depends on the security of non-targeted
(compromised) computers, as well as the security of the target.32
Moreover, under existing doctrines, users are not liable if their
computer is compromised and used in the attack.33 Because of this
liability rule, computer owners are unlikely to have sufficient
financial motivation to ensure that their systems are not vulnerable
to these attacks.34 Although DDoS attacks, are—by nature—unique
and complex, they exemplify how legal rules that define liability
may distort incentives to produce optimal data security.
In sum, economic theory contends that adequate cybersecurity
is likely to be underproduced by the market, and the empirical
evidence supports this theory as new companies disclose new
hacks and novel attacks almost daily. Furthermore, the data
security ecosystem is rife with negative externalities—situations
where poor security practices spill over to other users; yet, as we
will detail, certain features of data security hold promise for
generating positive spillovers as well.

28. Benjamin Powell, Is Cybersecurity a Public Good? Evidence from the Financial Services
Industry 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 497, 498 (2005) (“[C]ybersecurity is often assumed to be a ‘public
good’ that will be underprovided or fail to be provided at all in the private market.”); see also
Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of
Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 261 (2006).
29. Powell, supra note 28, at 498; see also Hal R. Varian, System Reliability and Free
Riding, in ECON. OF INFO. SEC. 1 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004).
30. Powell, supra note 28, at 498–99.
31. Wajeeha Ahmad, Why Botnets Persist: Designing Effective Technical and Policy
Interventions, INTERNET POL’Y RSCH. INITIATIVE 1, 3 (2019), https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2019/09/publications-ipri-2019-02.pdf.
32. Id. at 5–6.
33. Jennifer A. Chandler, Liability for Botnet Attacks, 5 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 13, 19 (2006).
34. Id. at 18.
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B. The Move to the Cloud
1. The cloud in general
Prior to the turn towards cloud computing and storage, an
organization needed to maintain its client PCs and routers itself,
using its own servers and data storage devices.35 As a corollary,
storing information within an organization required that the firm
have the requisite resources (in terms of both physical and human
expertise) to protect the information it stored, analyzed, and used.36
Eventually, however, both firms and private users learned the
benefits of outsourcing their data storage. Instead of hosting all
of these resources within an organization, such resources could
be moved to a remote location, accessible through the internet—or
the “cloud.”37
According to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), cloud computing enables “ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable network resources . . . that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal . . . effort or service provider
interaction.”38 Cloud computing allows firms to replace local IT
capacities with those of a service provider.39 The service provider
grants access to a public cloud and offers data processing and
management service (including backup and recovery) to all clients
whose information is stored on the cloud.40 Cloud computing is key
to enabling a broad variety of novel business models such as
Software as a Service (Saas), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and
Platform as a Service (PaaS).41

35. Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623,
1632 (2013).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1632–33.
38. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T
OF COM., SPECIAL PUB. NO. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING (2011).
39. Sai Vennam, Cloud Computing, IBM (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/
cloud/learn/cloud-computing.
40. Id.
41. IBM Cloud Educ., IaaS vs. PaaS vs. SaaS, IBM (Sept. 2, 2021),
https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/iaas-paas-saas (defining the different “as a service”
models); see also As a Service, WIKIPEDIA, .https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As_a_service (last
visited Oct. 22, 2021) (listing various aaS models).
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A key paradigm for mapping out the cloud services market is
Gartner’s “magic quadrants,” which distinguished (in 2021)
between leaders (AWS, Google and Microsoft), visionaries
(Alibaba), niche players (Oracle, IBM and Tencent) and
challengers.42 Currently, the leaders control over half of the cloud
market and the market share of these firms is constantly growing.43
2. Salient cloud computing practices
Cloud computing has grown rapidly in the last decade, leading
some commentators to claim that “[n]ow, [a]lmost [e]verything is
hosted on a ‘cloud.’”44 Indeed, the empirical evidence supports the
belief that cloud computing is becoming more ubiquitous. For
example, between 2009 and 2017, cloud expenditures grew 4.5
times faster than traditional IT expenditures.45 The move to the
cloud is not limited to specific types of businesses; instead, cloud
infrastructure is being adopted by industry, academia, and
government organizations.46 One trend forcing the proliferation of
cloud computing and storage is the Internet of Things (IoT) where
a variety of digital devices are connected to the internet and
managed remotely.47 IoT requires efficient data transfer across
devices. According to recent scholarship, many examples of IoT
devices such as networked sensors render local storage a poor fit
42. Raj Bala, Bob Gill, Dennis Smith, Kevin Ji & David Wright, Magic Quadrant
for Cloud Infrastructure and Platform Services, GARTNER (July 27, 2021),
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-271OE4VR&ct=210802&st=sb.
43. Cloud Market Ends 2020 on a High While Microsoft Continues to Gain Ground on
Amazon, SYNERGY RSCH. (Feb. 2. 2021), https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloudmarket-ends-2020-high-while-microsoft-continues-gain-ground-amazon (indicating AWS’s
market share at around 32–34%, Microsoft’s at 20%, and Google’s at about 9%).
44. Allan Liu & Ting Yu, Overview of Cloud Storage and Architecture, INT’L J. SCI. & TECH.
RSCH. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649074.
45. Alex Lesser, The Cloud Vs. In-House Infrastructure: Deciding Which Is Best for Your
Organization, FORBES (July 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/
07/25/the-cloud-vs-in-house-infrastructure-deciding-which-is-best-for-your-organization/
?/?sh=271ed2de20f6.
46. Sukhpal Singh Gill, Shreshth Tuli, Minxian Xu, Inderpreet Singh, Karan Vijay
Singh, Dominic Lindsay, Shikhar Tuli, Daria Smirnova, Manmeet Singh, Udit Jain, Haris
Pervaiz, Bhanu Sehgal, Sukhwinder Singh Kaila, Sanjay Misra, Mohammad Sadegh
Aslanpour, Harshit Mehta, Blado Stankovski & Peter Garraghan, Transformative Effects of IoT,
Blockchain, and Artificial Intelligence on Cloud Computing: Evolution, Vision, Trends, and Open
Challenges, 8 INTERNET OF THINGS 1 (Dec. 2019).
47. Blesson Varghese & Rajkumar Buyya, Next Generation Cloud Computing: New
Trends and Research Directions, 79 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUT. SYS. 849, 854 (2018).
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for the technical needs of internet connected devices.48 And further,
these trends will likely accelerate, leading to a regime where most
data is stored and managed remotely through cloud
infrastructure.49 In other words, cloud computing is here to stay.
Though cloud computing is remarkably common, not all cloud
computing models are the same. Two different models of cloud
storage are worth mentioning. To start, consider a “data shard”
model of cloud storage. Sharding is a popular storage technique
that breaks datasets into small individual units (shards) and stores
these shards in several different international locations.50 For
instance, an individual file can be broken up into smaller pieces
with many of these constituent pieces stored at different domestic
and even international servers belonging to the same cloud
provider.51 Importantly, the cloud storage network automatically
routes different shards to different locations in the network to
ensure performance and reliability of the storage network
generally. In doing so, it applies the broader principles of internet
protocols that strive to distribute communications by packet
switching to promote efficiency and resilience.52
The shard model of cloud storage is particularly noteworthy
because—as Paul Schwartz explains—it defies territoriality and
national boundaries by storing the components of a single file
across different jurisdictions.53 Yet the shift to the data shard model
also creates an infrastructure where many different clients from
different backgrounds and locations may store information on
the same server. Given the need to cater to high standards dictated
by some clients, the “shard” model produces the possibility
of jurisdictional-based spillovers, which are discussed in more
detail below.
By contrast, a “data localization” cloud does not route pieces of
information across international boundaries. Instead, cloud storage
48. Id.
49. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 197 (rev. ed. 2003) (anticipating some of the constituent elements that would come
to comprise cloud computing).
50. Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681,
1693 (2018).
51. Id. at 1695.
52. See Tarleton Gillespie, Engineering a Principle: ‘End-to-End’ in the Design of the
Internet, 36 SOC. STUD. SCI. 427, 431 (2006).
53. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 1695.
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is contained within a single country or region.54 This model is
localized because the information stays within a specific
jurisdiction, rather than being broken up and stored in many
different places.55 Data localization clouds have gained some
traction as a response to many jurisdictions passing data
localization laws that require that cloud storage firms host
information within certain territorial boundaries.56 Proponents of
these laws justify them as bulwarks that shield the companies’
domestic users from surveillance by foreign intelligence services.57
However, data localization clouds appear to be somewhat
unpopular in many jurisdictions as their providers are limiting
their operations, likely in response to limited consumer demand.58
Despite the differences between these types of cloud storage
services, there is one significant feature that contributes to their
potential to generate spillovers: they are public clouds.59 Unlike
private clouds that restrict storage infrastructure to a single person
or organization, a public cloud allows many different organizations
(or people) to store or process their information in the same general
infrastructure.60 Further, some groups within a public cloud
infrastructure may require higher levels of security that are applied
globally. This security spillover increases the level of protection for

54. Id. at 1696.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677,
708–13 (2015).
57. Tatevik Sargsyan, Data Localization and the Role of Infrastructure for Surveillance,
Privacy, and Security, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 2221 (2016); see also Tim Maurer & Garrett Hinck,
Cloud Security: A Primer for Policymakers 40, (Aug. 2020) (Working Paper) (accessible at
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Maurer_Hinck_Cloud_Security-V3.pdf).
58. For example, the Microsoft Azure local cloud in Germany has stopped receiving
new customers, indicating limited business interest for this idea. Id. at 40. Yet, perhaps it is a
result of the local cloud being an inferior product given the inability to share the data
worldwide and receive support directly from Microsoft.
59. What Are Public, Private, and Hybrid Clouds?, MICROSOFT AZURE,
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-are-private-public-hybrid-clouds/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (“Public clouds are the most common type of cloud computing
deployment.”). For instance, common cloud storage systems run by large technology
companies—such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure—are public cloud systems. Id.
60. What Is a Public Cloud?, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/
overview/what-is-a-public-cloud/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
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other clients who are using the same platform, even if they were
unable to bargain for these additional safeguards.61
II. SECURITY SPILLOVERS AND THE CLOUD
While cybersecurity protections are notoriously inadequate,
transitioning to cloud storage marks an improvement for data
security generally. For instance, a recent report details that cloud
storage operations are ten times more secure than maintaining
storage systems in house.62 And further, the central-security risks
within cloud storage are user errors on the part of the client, rather
than the storage operator.63 These findings seem surprising given
the fact that cloud platforms might be considered prime targets for
hackers, given the substantial “bragging rights” and possible
monetary gains that will follow from a successful hack, (from
blackmailing hacked users, or selling or misusing their data).
Nonetheless, thus far cloud infrastructures have shown impressive
resilience (most likely a consequence of their substantial resources
as detailed below).
Beyond the obvious security benefits of cloud storage,64 the shift
to the cloud promotes spillovers of security across the service.
Security spillovers occur when a cloud provider implements
heightened security protection across the entire service, rather than
only to the specific subset of users who demand these additional
protections. Cloud storage is particularly amenable to spillovers
because partitioning the service along tiers with different security
protections is difficult to implement at the infrastructural level.
And further, even where partitioning is technologically possible,
it is undesirable because it leads to increased risks of liability
and reputational damage. As a result, firms are incentivized to
apply the protections of the most security-sensitive users across
the platform. And even when cloud systems provide tiered
services, their baseline service to all customers—which they do
61. This differs from the private cloud model where services are only offered to select
users. See What Is a Private Cloud?, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/
overview/what-is-a-private-cloud/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
62. Maurer & Hinck, supra note 57, at 23.
63. Id. at 26–28.
64. See Steven Bellovin, Clouds from Both Sides, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY, May–June
2011, at 88, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/cloud.pdf (discussing some of the
costs and benefits of securing information on the cloud).
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not partition—is reasonable and probably more robust than
the protections basic users would have been able to bargain
for themselves.
Beyond this introduction, this Part begins with a short overview
of spillovers and how they relate to infrastructure. We focus on the
infrastructure paradigm because it mirrors some important
characteristics of cloud processing and storage. Next, this Part
examines three modes of indivisibility that prevent cloud storage
services from segmenting their service. These different types of
indivisibility allow security benefits to flow across platforms and
raise the level of security for clients who may
not have been able to bargain for these additional benefits. And
finally, this Part provides three test cases where spillovers are
already occurring.
Before proceeding, we wish to distinguish between two forms
of cybersecurity risks that might materialize in a cloud service
environment, only one of which will be discussed here. This Article
focuses on breaches and hacks which compromise the cloud
providers’ hardware, software, and networks—and the dynamics
that unfold as a result of the measures taken to mitigate them. Such
breaches are mostly within the responsibility of the cloud
operators. There is a second set of cybersecurity risks which this
Article sets aside – breaches that result from the user’s errors in
improperly configuring their service as well as user-generated
problems with both the data and the account. Recent reports
indicate that misconfigurations and other human errors cause the
vast majority of cloud breaches.65 Indeed, the process of setting up
a cloud service is highly complex and, therefore, creates potential
avenues for configuration errors committed by the end user.66
Nonetheless, we set this latter category of risks aside, as this
form of risk is almost always allocated to the users. A popular risk
allocation paradigm, promoted among others by AWS67 and
65. James Rundle, Human Error Often the Culprit in Cloud Data Breaches, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 27, 2019, 3:24 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/human-error-often-the-culpritin-cloud-data-breaches-11566898203 (citing Gartner’s studies and noting the hackers seek
out such misconfigurations).
66. Id. (indicating that the instructions for setting up some AWS accounts are 130 pages
long and that even missing one minor configuration could have “disastrous” implications).
67. Shared Responsibility Model, AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/sharedresponsibility-model/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (“Customers should carefully consider the
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Microsoft Azure,68 is that of “shared responsibility.” Using this
concept, cloud providers strive to limit their potential liability for
these forms of breaches. This is done through the user agreement,
which governs the relationship between cloud providers details
how the risks and subsequent liability for breaches are allocated
between the parties, indeed often allocating risk of configuration
errors to users.
A. Spillovers Generally and Spillovers as—and in—Infrastructure
1. A general account of spillovers
Spillovers are commonly understood as benefits that one
person’s activity provides to another.69 Using economic
terminology, they might be referred to as positive externalities (we
detail the challenges of this definition in Part III). For example, a
person’s decision to plant a rose garden in their yard improves the
quality of their neighbor’s evening stroll. In addition, the rose
garden may cause the value of the neighbor’s home to appreciate.
Importantly, however, the gardener decides to plant the roses out
of self-interest; nonetheless, others are affected by this action.
Spillovers are possible because of the inherent sociality of existence:
our actions often spill over onto others because we exist
in communities and interact with other individuals, rather than
in isolation.70
Spillovers and externalities occur in a variety of forms. Public
goods, such as lighthouses, have been known to generate

services they choose as their responsibilities vary depending on the services used, the
integration of those services into their IT environment, and applicable laws and
regulations.”). AWS distinguishes in the following way: AWS is responsible for security “of”
the cloud, while customers are responsible for security “in” the cloud. Id. AWS is responsible
for the hardware, software, networking, and facilities of the could service. Id. The customer
Is responsible for configurations and cloud management, as well as properly classifying their
assets. Id.
68. Terry Lanfear, Shared Responsibility in the Cloud, MICROSOFT (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility.
69. Mark A. Lemley & Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258
(2007) (defining spillovers). Spillovers might be considered positive externalities, but this
conceptual reduction is not without complications. See discussion infra Part III.
70. Id. at 259 (explaining that spillovers are possible because “we share a common
environment, live in communities, and interact with one another”).
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externalities and, in addition, concerns about free riding.71
Lighthouses provide a benefit to each ship whether or not its
occupants have contributed to the installation and upkeep of the
lighthouse. In some sense, the positive benefits of a lighthouse
constitute externalities because exclusion is quite difficult. It is
impossible to exclude some ships from the benefit of the lighthouse
based purely on whether they have paid for the service.
Similarly, the difficulty of exclusion gives rise to concerns about
underproduction. That is, even if taxes are levied in the city where
the lighthouse stands, some shipping companies may avoid paying
because they will get the benefit whether they contribute or not. As
a result, public goods may be underproduced because the market
does not adequately create private incentives that match the social
benefits of these goods.72
2. Spillovers, infrastructure, and the cloud
Cybersecurity spillovers within cloud services resemble a
specific set of externalities examined in the legal literature—those
pertaining to infrastructures. Infrastructures are commonly
considered to be shared resources that can be used for many
different ends—some of which are more lucrative and productive
than others.73 Rivalrous infrastructure often provides additional
benefits to users of its service largely because these projects are built
to withstand peak demand. However, demand is not usually at its
highest, so users who use rivalrous infrastructure during periods
of lower demand are receiving a premium service purely because
fewer people happen to be using the resource concurrently (yet are
often not charged for such premium service).
In addition, many infrastructure projects face difficulties when
attempting to discriminate according to price or service.74 This
discrimination could, in theory, diminish free riding and force
71. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. OF ECON. & STAT.
387 (1954) (offering the canonical description of public goods and the free riding problem).
72. William H. Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 927 (1974) (claiming that the classical position within economics is that the
market will underproduce public goods).
73. See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF
SHARED RESOURCES (2013).
74. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 979 (2005).

947

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

those who derive a greater benefit from the service to internalize
these greater benefits (for instance by incurring additional costs).
Yet, discrimination between different users of infrastructure is
often impossible, due to the high costs (both economic and
political) of distinguishing between different uses and pricing them
accordingly.75 As a result, positive externalities persist. This is not
necessarily undesirable; as we detail below, excess capacity often
generates benefits.
To demonstrate how spillovers typically operate within
rivalrous infrastructure, consider highways. Highways are built to
withstand rush-hour traffic, but highways also provide
transportation access for many other travelers with different needs
and preferences. Further, some highway operators try to extract
prices closer to the peak of users’ willingness to pay by
implementing additional costs such as tolls for high-occupancy
lanes and taxes for large commercial trucks.76 However, in many
cases, implementing additional fees is too costly or practically
infeasible. As a result, highways usually end up charging flat fees
from drivers, or receive funding from local or even federal taxes. In
these cases, off-peak drivers and drivers of narrower vehicles enjoy
the leisure of driving with relative safety and ease through empty,
broad lanes without paying for these benefits created by excess
capacity. Similarly, those carrying out important activities during
off-peak hours (such as driving to school) also benefit from this
spillover, as opposed to merely leisure drivers (we acknowledge
that this highway analogy has its limits).
Infrastructure spillovers are both common and desirable.
According to Lemley and Frischmann, spillovers are “[g]ood for
society unless it happens that the incremental social benefits of
eking out every last ounce of control outweigh the marginal social
cost of that last increment of control.” Put differently, the costs of
internalization might exceed other benefits of the spillover. If that
is the case, charging every user for the precise benefit they accrue
is unreasonable and inefficient. In most cases, then, infrastructure
spillovers are desirable and remedying them would destroy the
social benefit they provide.77 Indeed, according to a popular
75. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 69 at 299.
76. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231 (2000).
77. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 69 at 260.
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opinion regarding externalities in general, governmental
intervention is justified when the actual allocations diverge from an
optimal one. Given the nature of externalities in the cloud, this
might not prove to be the case.78
The benefits of spillovers are not solely restricted to physical
infrastructures; instead, spillovers are likely more beneficial when
they emanate from knowledge infrastructures enabled by the
internet. When considering knowledge-based commons (or
infrastructures), Frischmann claims that spillovers promote our
collective ability to innovate and create.79 Positive externalities that
are created in these situations should be ignored and possibly even
encouraged.80 The effort to promote spillovers leads to clear policy
choices for network design (peer to peer), network management
(network neutrality), and IP laws (limited protections).81
The infrastructure spillovers paradigm—which actively
promotes spillovers—should be expanded to apply to cloud
service providers and the excess security their services often
provide. Similar to highways built to accommodate rush hour
traffic and diverse uses, cloud services may provide “peak”
services such as enhanced physical security, advanced encryption,
password protection, backups, and firewalls. All of these additional
features protect information that—from the perspective of the
firms who are contracting for cloud storage—may not necessarily
justify such robust security practices. However, this security
“excess” provides additional protection against cyberattacks
and further offsets the underproduction of security. Stepping
outside the “security” paradigm, cloud service provides benefits to
those engaging in learning and education which exceed the
expectation of such users, as the system was set in place for other,
business-oriented objectives.82
Critics may chafe at extending the infrastructure paradigm to
cloud services. After all, cloud providers do not obviously resemble
providers of paradigmatic infrastructures. These typical
infrastructures are often government-run or government-funded
78. NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE: THE
EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 80 (2004).
79. Frischmann, supra note 74, at 1017.
80. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 300 (2014).
81. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 69 at 284.
82. We thank Brett Frischmann for this point.
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platforms which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Cloud
platforms are the exact opposite. They feature proprietary, private
systems governed by contractual relationships, which could be
easily tailored to allow internalization. Furthermore, cloud
platforms offer a limited and exhaustible resource that firms are
incentivized to provision stingily.
We believe, however, that expanding the infrastructure
paradigm to include cloud services is a reasonable—if not natural—
extension. Applying Frischmann’s terminology, we conclude that
cloud computing systems are “enabling platforms”83 which
generate vast benefits “downstream.”84 Cloud providers facilitate
producing and sheltering ideas.85 As a result, the security of cloud
storage platforms is necessarily intertwined with protecting
important knowledge resources that are key conditions for
innovation more generally. Therefore, spillovers within cloud
operations—and cloud storage in particular—would promote
innovation and other policy goals in similar fashion to spillovers
within other information technology contexts. As a result,
spillovers are generally a net positive, which outweigh the need to
compensate platforms.
Given the conceptual similarity between cloud storage and
other infrastructure, it is unsurprising that cloud security has
already been singled out for infrastructure-like regulatory attention
in other legal jurisdictions. For instance, in the European Union, the
NIS Directive for regulating critical digital infrastructure has
designated cloud services as worthy of special regulatory attention
and protection because of their infrastructural features. The
Directive obligates member states to introduce rules mandating
specific disclosures by cloud service operators as well as rules
requiring specific security applications.86 In the next section, we
83. Frischmann, supra note 74, at 957.
84. Id. at 958.
85. See Asaf Cidon, Protecting Intellectual Property in the Cloud, WIPO MAGAZINE (June
2015), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2015/03/article_0004.html.
86. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
2016 Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and
Information Systems Across the Union, 2016 O.J. (L 194) (“NIS Directive”). Annex III
designating “cloud computing service” as a “digital service” for the purpose of Article 4 (5).
Id. at L 194/13. Such “digital services” are subjected to specific regulatory requirements. For
instance, according to Article 16, member state laws must ensure that they take measures to
manage network security risks and prevent negative outcomes. Id. at L 194/21.
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introduce and discuss additional contexts in which spillovers
within cloud infrastructures might be socially beneficial and detail
the regulatory implications that follow.
B. Required Elements for Positive Externalities in Cloud-Based
Data Security
Positive externalities within cloud-based data security are
principally a product of indivisibility, or situations where cloud
providers do not distinguish between different users within the
services they provide. Indivisibility drives externalities because the
effects of certain decisions by cloud storage managers—or even
effects of the infrastructure itself—cannot be restricted to certain
groups that use the service. Instead, these effects travel across
groups leading to spillovers. This section details three principal
types of indivisibilities within cloud storage platforms.
First, infrastructural indivisibility is the product of the difficulty
of partitioning the underlying infrastructures of cloud storage
platforms. Here, infrastructure includes the hardware, software,
and communications technology that makes up cloud systems as
well as physical protection for its data centers and the knowledge
resources acquired by firms and employees. Second, liability
indivisibility describes the prospect of legal liability and its role in
incentivizing firms to enhance security for all users—even if
partitioning is possible—out of caution that mistakes would lead to
accidentally treating some “high” security clients as “low” security
ones. Third, reputational indivisibility follows from the fact that a
firm’s reputation is not divided along the different services that
they provide. More specifically, a firm that offers both premium
and basic levels of protection will experience reputation harms
even if only the basic system is compromised. Again, the possibility
of reputation harms resulting from breaches of basic security
systems encourages cloud service providers to ensure adequate
security for all users of the service.
Our analysis of indivisibilities complements Professor Anu
Bradford’s discussion of divisibility within the “Brussels Effect.”87
87. This discussion of geographical effects, as Bradford concedes, is far from novel.
The “Brussels Effect” was preceded by the “California Effect” and will most likely be
followed by the “Beijing” one. The uniqueness of the Brussels Effect is that it is not merely
driven by economies of scale, but additional dynamics which she details. BRADFORD, supra note
10, at 5.
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Bradford defines the Brussels Effect as one in which “markets are
transmitting the E.U.’s regulations to both market participants and
regulators outside the E.U.”88 Bradford’s central claim is that in
several regulatory contexts, the European Union’s strict and
comprehensive regulatory regime generates effects that reach far
beyond continental Europe. This, Bradford explains, does not result
from the European Union’s ability to coerce nations and firms to
obey its rules beyond its borders. Rather, it results from technical,
economic, and political dynamics which lead firms and nations to
adopt these strict standards voluntarily. Of specific relevance to our
discussion is Bradford’s analysis of the de facto Brussels Effect in
which global corporations adjust their global conduct to the E.U.
regulation without any foreign regulatory response.89
We find the Brussel’s Effect akin to situations where cloud
providers adjust security features across the entire service. Because
of this conceptual similarity, a close examination of the Brussel’s
Effect offers clues for why security providers respond at the
platform level rather than to segmented groups within the service.
Bradford lists several prerequisite conditions for the Brussel’s
Effect: the most important condition for our analysis is whether the
product or service is divisible.90 In analyzing divisibility, Bradford
presents a three-part taxonomy which distinguishes between
technical, legal, and economic indivisibility.91
Here, we offer a discussion of spillovers and indivisibility that
both relies upon and extends Bradford’s work on jurisdictional
influence. In addition, data security requires introducing new
features of indivisibility which are not fully recognized by
Bradford’s earlier work. By transcending Bradford’s conceptual
work on divisibility, we gain a better understanding of how and
when spillovers unfold within cloud-based data security systems.

88. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 1.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 27–49. Importantly, however, divisibility is not the only requirement for a
Brussel’s Effect. Bradford also considers other prerequisite conditions such as the
influencer’s market power and the technical expertise of regulators. Id.
91. Bradford claims that divisibility is the most salient factor for determining whether
a Brussel’s Effect will occur. See BRADFORD, supra note 10.
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1. Infrastructural indivisibility
Spillovers result from the basic elements that comprise standard
cloud-based data security. For instance, the infrastructural
elements that underlie data security implemented through cloud
systems include technical infrastructure, physical infrastructure,
and knowledge-based infrastructure. Taken together, the
infrastructure of cloud storage platforms is difficult to divide in a
way that allows the storage provider to distinguish between users
and deliver different types of services and security levels that
correspond to different user’s needs. Because it is challenging for
cloud service providers to make these security distinctions, they are
incentivized to ratchet up security for all users. In other words, the
cloud provider’s enhanced security practices will naturally spill
over these boundaries because they cannot be easily separated to
create partitioned security services. And even if such division is
possible, it might be costly, meaningless, and ignored.
Indivisibilities of technical infrastructure are quite common.
The choice to use a single physical infrastructure—such as a
manufacturing process—is partially a response to the need to meet
baseline compliance thresholds. In many contexts, it is cheaper for
a firm to manufacture all their products using the same underlying
infrastructure rather than create multiple systems that are not all in
compliance with strict regulations. After all, assembly lines and
manufacturing processes entail high fixed costs, which encourages
firms to invest in a single process that meets the most stringent
regulatory requirements. Having one production process also
reduces costs related to inventory management and storage.92

92. Id. at 60. For instance, this was the case regarding compliance with the E.U.’s
ROHS Directive which prohibits the use of some hazardous substances in electronics. As
global firms moved to meet this Directive’s requirements, they shifted their entire
manufacturing operation to be in compliance and ceased manufacturing non-compliant
products given the cost of maintaining separate production lines. Similar dynamics unfolded
in the chemical industry where firms moved to comply with the E.U.’s REACH law for all
products (even those which were not destined to be exported to E.U. markets) given the costs
of separate developing plants. Id. at 92. The examples need not be limited to Europe. Similar
outcomes followed the introduction of stricter emission laws in California which impacted
car manufacturing globally (initiating the “California Effect”) Id. at 60; see also Regulation
(EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006
Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 2007 O.J. (L 396/1).
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On its face, cloud computing’s technical infrastructure appears
easier to compartmentalize than a conventional assembly line.
After all, the technical infrastructure of cloud-based storage seems
more readily customizable and amenable to segmentation than
machinery. Indeed, not every client requires Department of
Defense level security. A cloud provider can designate a specific
server, (or even virtual machine) to a specific user, whose systems
will receive customized security specifications, which will differ
from the other users on the same machines.
That said, there are a couple of principal reasons why the
technical infrastructure of cloud services should nonetheless be
considered indivisible. After all, and regardless of the cloud
provider’s attempt to sell the notion of customized products, much
of the system is indivisible for technical reasons. Clients are using
the same hardware, they are connected to the same cables, serviced
by the same technicians, and patched with the same code and
protocol. While some clients receive add-ons and premium
services, many of their services are the same and, as a result, the
risk and vulnerabilities they face are similar as well. Creating
meaningful partitions could arguably be achieved through
distinguishing between premium and basic clients by creating
separate servers for hosting data. However, creating and
maintaining two different storage systems in parallel is costly and
undercuts the firm’s ability to benefit from economies of scale.
The benefits of scale for cloud computing can also be viewed
from a more charitable angle. When cloud operators maintain an
infrastructure that meets the needs of high-end clients, they can
quite easily—and for a low marginal cost—expand these services
to their other clients. For instance, if a firm develops a system for
applying strict authentication and patching protocols for some
clients (as well as other forms of maintenance, such as updates),
they can easily do so for others.93 Thus, for a minimal cost,
additional security features can be provided to all clients. Relatedly,
when cloud operators cater to high-end clients (such as
governments) they have the “privilege” of being subjected to
advanced and sophisticated cyberattacks. Knowledge of such attacks
allows them to take defensive measures prior to the migration of
these sophisticated attacks to other, less-coveted targets.
93. We thank Prof. Steven Bellovin (Columbia University) for this insight.
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Further, operating cloud infrastructure using a tiered model—
or providing several different levels of security—complicates a
firm’s ability to utilize excess capacity within the network. If a firm
implements different tiers of services, then excess capacity can only
be used within the specific tier that generated the capacity, rather
than across the service more broadly. The shard model of cloud
computing represents an extreme example of the benefits of using
a single, strict protocol.94 Here, all of the firm’s systems are
potentially shared with all clients at all times. Adopting and
managing different security tiers will add a potentially
unmanageable level of complexity to the firm’s shard operations
and, by extension, limit its overall efficiency and effectiveness.
Yet even outside of the shard model, some specific business
aspects of cloud storage make the prospect of using separate
servers and plants with different tiers of security unappealing.
Consider, for instance, the physical infrastructure that enables
recovery and backup at remote locations that must be separated by
sufficient distance to assure resiliency.95 The obvious natural
consequence of backup requirements is that primary and back-up
servers are needed. Therefore, the cost and complexity of storing
data increases significantly if a cloud storage firm distinguishes
between clients and affords them different levels of security. The
result of this decision is that some cloud centers the firm uses may
only be devoted to a specific tier of service, rather than serving as a
storage and recovery center for all tiers of data. And further, this
result requires a duplication of the tiered model which dramatically
increases complexity and cost.96
Even if a cloud operator’s resources might prove divisible on
the technical level, there is the indivisible nature of the actual
physical plant and its security measures. While the cloud provider
94. Schwartz, supra note 50.
95. Experts disagree about how far data centers must be physically separated to
ensure resiliency—somewhere between 30 to 100 miles, or possibly even more. See
Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Apr. 7, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
34-47638.htm.
96. One potential half-solution to this puzzle would be for a firm to distinguish
between clients at their primary locations of data storage but ratchet up security for all backup centers to minimize costs. Yet it may just be more cost-effective to increase security across
the board in order to invest fewer resources in creating and maintaining server farms for
different types of clients.
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might separate the computerized systems used, it would likely still
use a similar premise for its operations given economies of scale
and other operational needs. This aspect creates yet another form
of indivisibility and source of potential spillover.
For example, it is common practice for cloud service
agreements to include representations regarding fire and flood
protection97 as well as physical security and access
authorizations.98￼It is possible that a cloud provider might set up
different sites with different security and resilience standards and
only require additional security and resilience requirements within
the high-security sites. However, this seems unlikely. Again,
economies of scale probably lead firms to consolidate their
operations. This consolidation generates spillovers because the firm
will increase security practices across all data centers. In other
words, the costs of distinguishing between data centers along
security practices may exceed the potential benefits of saving on
security requirements for marginal uses. 99
Knowledge based infrastructure is another source of
indivisibility and spillover.100 Cloud security employs an array of
knowledge infrastructures including skilled IT experts who
produce and manage cloud security systems. Once a cloud entity
provides premium security services to some clients, it must
employ experts to maintain premium services. When data security
firms hire sophisticated employees, their skills and knowledge are
bound to “spill” into other security projects the firm governs,
which increases the security standards of these other projects.101
97. See ISO 27001 Annex A.11: Physical & Environmental Security, A.11.1.4: Protecting
against External & Environmental Threats, ISMS ONLINE, https://www.isms.online/iso27001/annex-a-11-physical-and-environmental-security/.
98. Information Security Annex, DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, https://www.telekom.com/
resource/blob/568716/5f553ff65de8a731fdca0b7544983bad/dl-information-security-annexv3-1-aeb-pdf-data.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2021); see also Genesys Master Subscription
Agreement, GENESYS, https://www.genesys.com/company/legal-docs/genesys-mastersubscription-agreement-for-cloud-services-02072018 (last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (detailing the
physical security requirements that are provided including “monitored points of entry” and
“surveillance cameras”).
99. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 54.
100. Frischmann, supra note 74 (explaining how “knowledge” is yet another form of
commons).
101. Alison DeNisco Rayome, Report: 57% of Businesses Can’t Find Enough IT Security
Pros, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/
report-57-of-businesses-cant-find-enough-it-security-pros/.
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Even if less sophisticated data security employees are hired to
manage operations for the firm’s basic clients, the protocols set in
place by the highly skilled and paid experts will be used in basic
security environments as well, raising the overall level of security
yet again.102
In sum, various technical features and business practices of
cloud providers incentivize these firms to make fewer distinctions
between clients at the technical level. This creates situations in
which information is stored and processed in similar conditions,
which reduces costs and enhances overall security.
Before concluding, it is important to note that current cloud
providers offer distinct services that appear to promote divisibility
and potentially undermine security spillovers. The most prominent
cloud providers offer a rich menu of services, including various
forms of advanced security protection. This is apparent from
browsing through the pricing catalogues of large cloud providers
such as Google Cloud103 or AWS.104 Moreover, AWS appears to
allow customization options that surpass the other large cloud
providers.105 Indeed, not all cloud providers have the ability to
provide a similarly rich menu of options as AWS, which is partially
a product of its extensive infrastructure of servers. The existence of
customer choice for security tools does not, however, undermine
our overall argument about substantial indivisibility in security.
Even though cloud firms provide users with some choices, there is
a substantial baseline of services and protections which are
provided to all customers.106
102. Id.
103. Google Cloud Price List, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/pricing/list
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (indicating prices for Cloud Data Loss Prevention and other
services such as key management); see also, Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Pricing,
GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/dlp/pricing (detailing various features and the
price for these services such as “content method inspection”) (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
104. See
AWS’s
Pricing
Calculator,
AMAZON WEB SERVICES
(2021),
https://calculator.aws/#/addService (last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (indicating a long list of
services which could be purchased for additional fees, for instance, AWS CloudHSM allows
customers to purchase a managed hardware security module or a web Application Firewall).
105. See AWS Direct Connect Resiliency Recommendations, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (2021),
https://aws.amazon.com/directconnect/resiliency-recommendation/#:~:text=Amazon
%20Web%20Services%20(AWS)%20offers,%2C%20and%20cost%2Deffective%20way (last
visited Oct. 15, 2021).
106. This follows from explicit representations by these companies and implicit in the
services that they offer clients.
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2. Risk and liability indivisibility
a. New and avoidable risks of liability
The previous subsection examined indivisibility where it is
mostly driven by economics of scale and the cloud’s physical
features. Yet indivisibility in the cloud computing context is also
driven by a response to risk and legal liability. The primary risk that
data security firms face from offering tiered services is that
breaches will migrate from low security environments to higher
security ones. The fallout from a breach migrating from low
security to high security environments is severe enough that firms
will forego the potential profits of tiering in order to guard against
vulnerability migration across the service. Worse still, under a
tiered system the initial breach might not even constitute a violation
of the firm’s obligations; however, if higher security levels are also
compromised by the initial breach, then this could lead to violations
of the firm’s more stringent security commitments.107 Taken
together, the risks are significant enough to drive firms towards
uniformly applying security requirements.
It is fair to assume that cloud services are indivisible and apply
protections universally in response to two principal liability risks.
First, cloud services must actively guard against situations where
data that should be stored according to heightened security
standards is comingled with data that is stored under more lax
protections. Errors are unavoidable within data security systems,
and mistakes may lead to confusion about which data should be
protected according to which standard. More specifically, a data
flow originating from a premium client might find its way to a
different segment of the digital infrastructure. Often, this could
occur because of mistakes made by employees who oversee system
configuration. By offering several tiers of security, storage
providers merely impose additional risk to premium services,
which increases the potential liability of the cloud provider. In
response to this concern, firms would most likely opt to refrain
from offering lower security options altogether and instead apply
uniformly high standards for all services.
Second, tiering within data security systems creates an
additional set of security vulnerabilities stemming from external
107. We thank Ira Rubinstein for illuminating this point.
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actors, rather than internal errors. That is, hackers may compromise
higher security environments by initially gaining access to the
system through vulnerabilities in lower security environments.
Once hackers infiltrate lower security environments, they may
“leap” security barriers that differentiate security tiers and
compromise high security systems.108
While estimating the chance of these attacks is quite difficult,
the fallout and potential damage from attacks that begin in low
security environments and migrate is quite significant. Worse still,
plaintiffs are likely to have an easy legal road to recovering against
the service provider because the harm directly follows from the
provider failing to meet their contractual requirements. After all,
comingling causes data to be protected at lower security levels in
violation of the contract between cloud provider and client.109
Further, data that is stored according to premium security
standards will likely be sensitive and potentially lead to more
significant damages for both the client (the breach itself) and the
data security firm (the legal action in the wake of the breach). To
make matters worse, some data security contracts include
liquidated damages which would likely impose stringent penalties
on negligent data security firms.110
Finally, data security firms are inclined to invest a great deal
of effort to retain their premium customers. Cloud providers
often advertise their services by mentioning that high security
clients use111 their service as well as the fact that these customers
may pay more for data security services than garden variety clients.

108. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is an Air Gap?, WIRED (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:15 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/12/hacker-lexicon-air-gap/.
109. Breach of contract cases represent a clearer path to recovery for plaintiffs than tort
claims. This is because under a breach of contract cause of action a plaintiff needs only to
show that there was a breach and harm. Under a tort suit, the plaintiff must also demonstrate
that the defendant was negligent. See Jay P, Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Liability for Data Injuries,
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 295 (2019). However, cloud storage providers often contractually waive
liability for breaches, which limits the amount that plaintiffs may recover under a breach of
contract suit. See Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir.
2016) (per curiam).
110. See Information Security Annex, DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, https://www.telekom.com/
resource/blob/568716/5f553ff65de8a731fdca0b7544983bad/dl-information-security-annexv3-1-aeb-pdf-data.pdf.
111. Vanessa Ho, A New Walmart ‘Cloud Factory’ Will Accelerate Digital Innovation, Boost
Business Efficiency, MICROSOFT (Nov. 5, 2018), https://news.microsoft.com/transform/newwalmart-cloud-factory-innovation-business-efficiency/.
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Taken together, cloud service providers have strong incentives to
protect the interests of their premium clients and face substantial
risk if they are harmed. In response to these legal and business
risks, cloud providers are likely to maintain high security levels
across the board which are also bolstered by the benefits of
economies of scale.112
b. Commingling and boundary leaping in other contexts
While the specific ways in which the specter of legal risk may
lead to indivisibility may seem unique to data security, this is not
necessarily the case. Similar dynamics have been detailed in other
contexts and provide further clues regarding the incentives for
indivisibility in cloud security. For instance, Bradford examines
ways in which legal risks might create strong incentives for
indivisibility policies and outcomes; namely, opting for a uniformly
high standard.113 Bradford explains that divisibility is often difficult
to achieve because risk factors tend to migrate from one part of a
firm’s operation to another. She also details the “legal risks
associated with compliance errors” and how these risks might
affect stock prices, incentivizing firms to exercise caution by opting
for a global, stringent standard.114
When moving to concrete examples, Bradford analyzes both
digital and data markets—yet devotes little attention to data
security issues. When discussing data protection law, Bradford
notes that Google adjusted its “global operations to the most
demanding E.U. standard” because of “the difficulty of
determining with certainty whether a particular user is a ‘European
data subject[.]’” Given the dire implications of such an error,
Bradford explains that Google’s rational response was indeed to
shift its entire operation to comply with the European Union’s more
rigorous standard.115
Although data protection and data security are somewhat
similar, Google’s choice to comply with the GDPR’s privacy aspects
in its global operations provides limited insights for data security.
Data protection does not provide a perfect analogue for data
112.
113.
114.
115.
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security concerns because personal data could be effectively tagged
and segmented according to geographic provenance or any other
characteristic, which would substantially limit the risk of migration
and comingling.116 In addition, risks in data protection (unlike data
security) are borne out of the actions of internal actors rather than
external adversaries.117
Curiously, however, Bradford’s discussion of E.U. food safety
regulations provides more insight to data security practices than
her discussion of data protection. The food industry employs
indivisibility tactics as a response to Europe’s rigorous prohibition
of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). According to
European regulation, even a tiny amount of GMO material renders
a product unfit for sale in the European Union.118
In theory, firms interested in exporting to the European Union
could develop separate production lines and even plants: one for
E.U. exports and another for all other markets. This would allow
the firms to limit the costs associated with E.U. compliance and
benefit from the use of GMOs in other markets. However,
many firms opt to accept the stricter E.U. standards across the
board—by making all their operations compliant with E.U.
regulations—even though this introduces additional cost.119 This
production decision is largely a product of the difficulty of
achieving sufficient divisibility between GMO and non-GMO crops
and production lines.
Moreover, this challenge is particularly difficult considering the
risks of “comingling” “cross-contamination” and “crosspollination.”120 And further, the low threshold of GMO material
which makes a product unfit for sale in the European Union makes
it too risky to produce any GMO products out of the fear of
contamination across product lines.121 In fact, the legal risks
associated with separating GMO from non-GMO seeds is an
116. One might also argue that personal data is a much more complex issue, and thus
successfully segmenting it for tailored legal treatment is far more challenging.
117. Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667,
676–77 (2013).
118. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 183.
119. For an overview of the E.U.’s regulation of crops and GMOs, see Katharine Gostek,
Genetically Modified Organisms: How the United States’ and the European Union’s Regulations
Affect the Economy, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 761, 772 (2016).
120. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 58, 182.
121. Id. at 183.
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important factor “in explaining the reach of the Brussels Effect” in
the food sector.122
The response to GMO regulations offers a striking analogue for
cybersecurity. Within cybersecurity, risks may arise even though
data centers are kept separate and air gaps are set in place.123 For
example, air gaps could be compromised124 and computer viruses
might migrate from one set of servers to another in dynamics that
resemble
pollen
drifting
between
nearby
fields.125
In the security context, the disruptive force of wind currents
is replaced by the negligence of employees and the malicious act
of hackers that facilitate the migration of computer viruses in
the network.
Similarly, the risk of comingling crops is analogous to the risk
of confusing data streams that ultimately lead to a breach and
compromised security. Human and technical error may lead to
misplacing crops. Similarly, data may inadvertently be stored in the
wrong security segment where it can be compromised or lead to
other data being compromised by malicious code that makes its
way into the system. Bradford discusses the decisions made by
food processors and commodity traders who chose to abandon all
non-GMO/non-E.U.-approved grains out of fear they would be
interspersed with E.U.-destined products. Thus, Bradford
demonstrates how the latter set of risks led to de facto indivisibility
of crop storage operations.126 In response to the risk of comingling,
a similar dynamic may unfold within data storage, leading to the
uniform adoption of high standards by cloud service providers.
These analogues strengthen our contention that cloud
computing is largely indivisible and provides all users a similarly
high level of security. However, by examining these analogues
thoroughly, we can bring the limits of indivisibility into sharper
relief. Divisibility is not always impossible or undesirably risky.
When firms can control the risks of products migrating between
122. Id.
123. Zetter, supra note 108.
124. Max Eddy, Black Hat Researcher Shows Why Air Gaps Won’t Protect Your Data, PC
MAG (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.pcmag.com/news/black-hat-researcher-shows-why-airgaps-wont-protect-your-data; see also, Sanjay Chhillar, Common ICS Cybersecurity Myth #1:
The Air Gap, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY ALLIANCE (2021), https://gca.isa.org/blog/commonics-cybersecurity-myth-1-the-air-gap.
125. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 182–83.
126. Id.
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production lines, they are able to segment production and comply
with different regulatory standards.127 Here, divisibility would
undercut potential regulatory spillovers. For example, chocolate
manufacturers maintain separate production lines for E.U.- and
non-E.U.-destined products. Because M&Ms cannot be swept from
one production line to another, the risks of segmentation are
limited, and firms can take advantage of the benefits that
partitioning creates.
This leads us to a somewhat obscure question—are the
products provided by cloud computing services more like GMO
seeds or M&Ms? Generally, we find cloud computing to be more
like GMO seeds, where the risks of segmentation and comingling
are substantial. Data flows within cloud storage operations are
overwhelming in their magnitude and complexity. And further,
even limited overlap between data streams may lead to substantial
liability. Given these risks, operations within data security
companies are de facto indivisible, and by extension, basic users will
benefit from substantial spillovers.128
3. Reputation indivisibility
Cloud service providers that offer security services to both
premium and basic users run the risk that reputational harms from
breaches only affecting basic clients will also spill over and harm
the service provider’s reputation generally. This reputational
spillover will occur even if data from premium and basic users is
completely isolated and where breaches of basic security systems
do not provide a meaningful signal about the firm’s premium
security practices or lead to any legal liability. Reputation
indivisibility incentivizes cloud storage providers to increase
security standards for basic clients out of fear that breaches of basic
environments will damage the provider’s reputation.129 And as we
127. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 205.
128. However, this response might vary based on the specific cloud (or XaaS)
service involved.
129. Bradford mentions global firm’s brand vulnerability to activist pressure.
BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 62. Furthermore, she notes the notion of indivisibility driven by
brand recognition and reputation. However, she offers a different perspective on the
indivisibility of a firm’s brand. She notes that the firm’s efforts to maintain its brand would
lead it to meet higher standards, even when that is not required by law. Id. at 61. For instance,
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later explain, these dynamics are possibly strengthened by breach
notification laws.130
To demonstrate this point, consider a hypothetical news report
regarding data breaches and security failures within ACME cloud
storage’s basic tier. Reports of any breach within ACME’s system
will surely generate concerns among premium users. As a result,
premium users will face pressure to reassess their relationship with
ACME even though the premium service may not face any security
vulnerabilities. ACME may even respond to concerns by issuing a
press release assuring that the premium users’ services are
physically separate from basic users’, yet this still may not be
enough to assuage the concerns of the most security sensitive users
on the service.
The simple fact that premium and basic users receive services
from a single brand provides some assurance that basic users will
receive adequate security protections. This dynamic appears across
many markets which feature prominent brands. Firms strive to
protect their brand by upholding trademark laws that prevent
inferior products from being associated with their particular
brand.131 They further often act against the dilution of their brand
from firms operating in other markets.132 For instance, Google is
likely to police its trademark in cases where a firm sells “Google”
products in a market entirely unrelated to search engines (such as
bagels or toasters). The worry is that consumers will associate these
products with Google’s brand, and this could lead to potential
reputation harms. Within data security, because the cloud
providers’ brand and reputation will be indivisible in the eyes of
many users, the firm’s executives will apply a relatively high
level of security protection “across the board” to protect the brand
as well.

firms would not want to risk using chemicals in the U.S. which were deemed unsafe in the
E.U. Id. at 197. We are not convinced that the firm’s reputation is sufficiently salient to justify
adherence to higher security standards and therefore did not further develop this point in
the text.
130. For a review of these laws globally, see Mark Verstraete & Tal Zarsky, Optimizing
Breach Notification, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 803 (2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3650724.
131. Eric Goodman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397–419 (2008).
132. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution
Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2007).
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The effectiveness of the reputation-driven dynamic depends on
several conditions. First, firms might cease to be concerned with
their reputation if the market is highly concentrated and costumers
have no real alternatives. Similarly, reputation concerns might not
change firm behavior if switching between firms is costly and
difficult. In the event that either of these two conditions materialize,
reputation concerns will provide little incentive for firms to alter
their behavior.133
Reputational indivisibility offers key insights for two reasons.
First, as opposed to infrastructural indivisibility and risk/liability
indivisibility, reputational indivisibility is not contingent on the
fact that basic and premium user data are secured under similar
conditions. Instead, the fact that basic and premium users are
offered as a service under a single brand creates the incentives to
provide sufficient security to basic users. And further, reputational
indivisibility does not require the same (sometimes speculative)
empirical facts as other types of indivisibility. It thus enables us to
posit a spillover effect between premium and basic clients with
more certainty because it does not rely on the fact that the technical
infrastructure of security is difficult to partition.
Second, reputational indivisibility points toward obvious
policy implications. If policymakers decide that cybersecurity
spillovers are beneficial, they could promote this effect by
optimizing data flows about data breaches by cloud providers134—
even when breaches only implicate a firm’s basic services—to
ensure that this information is distributed broadly. As a result, this
dynamic could be enhanced by broader and stricter breach
notification laws. We return to this point in Part IV, below.
Unlike other forms of indivisibility, reputational indivisibility
offers a potential workaround by brands to offset some of the
reputational spillovers between their services. More specifically,
brands could attempt to circumvent the effects of reputational
indivisibility by partitioning their cloud operations into multiple
distinct brands. For example, a data security company could
create one brand for its basic services and another for its

133. We thank Prof. Roy Shapira (IDC Herzliya) for his insights regarding this point.
134. For a discussion of the interplay between breach notification laws and information
flow, see Verstraete & Zarsky, supra note 130, at 823.
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premium services.135 This brand division strategy could undermine
the possibility of reputational spillovers.
However, this concern could be mitigated by careful regulatory
intervention. Breach notification rules could be designed to
enhance information flows about the relationship between
companies that operate under a parent company. The possibility of
breach notification offering more capacious information is already
quite common— notifications often include more information than
just the name of the breached firm.136 It is not unreasonable for
regulators to craft data breach notification laws that require firms
to also disclose whether different brands operate under a single
parent company.
Practically speaking, however, cloud companies rarely (if ever)
partition their brands along different security levels. The lack of
partitioning between a cloud storage companies basic and
premium services indicates that reputational spillovers are likely
already facilitating security improvements.
C. Spillovers in Data Security (Three Case Studies)
So far, this Part has examined why cloud computing platforms
are amenable to spillover effects with a particular focus on how
indivisibility shapes these spillovers. In this section, we move from
theory to practice. We offer a taxonomy of common spillovers that
are occurring within cybersecurity in general and cloud services in
particular. In addition, each of the three spillovers implicates
different sets of policy concerns. First, governmental spillovers occur
when public agencies (such as the Department of Defense or other
government agencies) publicize procurement criteria or a tender.
They thereafter enter into cloud service agreements with properly
certified private vendors, leading to these vendors ensuring robust
security protections across all of their services. Second, jurisdictional
spillovers occur when a public cloud provider stores information
about individuals from a variety of jurisdictions—some of which
mandate higher security standards (such as the European Union).
135. For instance, Google has begun forking its brands as part of the “Alphabet”
conglomerate. See Avery Hartmans & Mary Meisenzahl, All the Companies and Divisions
Under Google’s Parent Company, Alphabet, Which Just Made Another Shake-Up to Its Structure,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/alphabetgoogle-company-list-2017-4.
136. Verstraete & Zarsky, supra note 130, at 827.
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And finally, bargaining power spillovers occur when private firms
obtain sufficient power to demand additional security that benefits
other clients on the platform.
1. Government contracts
Government contracts pertaining to cloud storage services
promote heightened security for other users who happen to use the
cloud service. Here, we demonstrate how the certification and
tender process lead to substantial security spillovers. Certification
is the process that the government uses to ensure that potential
vendors offer services that meet security standards that are
sufficiently robust for government use. The tender process is where
the government publishes a call for potential vendors to compete
for a government contract to produce some good or service.137
Security certification for United States government agencies is
based primarily on the Federal Risk and Authorization
Management Program (FedRAMP).138 FedRAMP mandates certain
security standards that cloud products must meet to be used
by different federal agencies. For instance, FedRAMP level 6
provides the security standards for cloud computing services that
protects classified government information.139 Private cloud
companies strive to have their products FedRAMP compliant, so
they can offer services to the federal government and other agencies

137. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22536, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND RESOURCES 2 (2021).
138. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., BEST PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES,
PROCUREMENT WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 (2016), https://cmls.gsa.gov/
servlet/servlet.FileDownload?retURL=%2Fapex%2FCMLSPubCategory%3FsearchKey%3D
CA-0022134%26source%3D5-16-00339&file=00Pt0000001RFhlEAG (“In the Federal sector, IT
security requirements for systems are governed by the Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA). While NIST publications provide standards and guidance for
FISMA, they do not specifically address cloud computing. GSA launched FedRAMP [Federal
Risk and Authorization Management Program] to provide a standardized approach to cloud
security featuring a ‘do once and reuse many times’ model to ensure FISMA compliance of
cloud systems used by the government.”) (footnotes omitted).
139. DEF. INFO. SYS. AGENCY, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CLOUD
COMPUTING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS GUIDE 29 (2017).
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that have followed suit with the federal government and require
FedRAMP compliance.140
The rush of many cloud service providers to meet FedRAMP
standards improves security for non-government firms that require
cloud storage. This security spillover follows from private
companies choosing cloud storage services from the FedRAMP
marketplace, which is a publicly available listing of firms that are
FedRAMP certified and provide services to the government.141 The
FedRAMP marketplace acts as a certification tool. By choosing
cloud storage firms from within the marketplace, private
companies choose cloud services that have adequate security
standards.142 Without the certification process, private companies
would be forced to examine the security practices of cloud firms
themselves and may err by choosing those that do not have
adequate protections.143
However, the spillover is arguably greater than just the
certification that FedRAMP provides. Even firms which are not
actively seeking cloud providers with FedRAMP certification will
benefit from efforts to meet government standards, as cloud
providers are likely to provide this high level of security to all of
their clients. Many large cloud storage firms affirmatively advertise
their services by mentioning their FedRAMP compliance and
claiming that many of their services—aimed at non-government
users—are in compliance. For example, AWS routinely publishes
which of their products meet FedRAMP standards and indicates
that non-government clients will also benefit from the certification

140. Legislating FedRAMP compliance is now considered in the following bill: the
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Authorization Act of 2021 or the
FedRAMP Authorization Act, H.R. 21, 117th Cong. (2021).
In a recent Executive Order, President Biden called for automating and
streamlining FedRAMP compliance, as well as its modernization. Specifically, it called for
developing security requirements for the cloud. See Exec. Order No. 14,028, 86 Fed. Reg.
26,633 (May 12th, 2021).
141. FedRAMP Marketplace, FEDRAMP, https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/
products?sort=productName (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
142. Why Your Cloud Business Needs FedRAMP Certification, LAZARUS ALLIANCE, (Dec.
24, 2018) https://lazarusalliance.com/fedramp-certification/ (“Private-sector companies
view FedRAMP as a gold standard of data security because they know how companies must
meet exacting requirements to obtain it.”).
143. For a similar argument, see Nir Kshetri, Privacy and Security Issues in Cloud
Computing: The Role of Institutions and Institutional Evolution, 37 TELECOMM. POL. 372 (2013)
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process,144 and so does Google.145 Microsoft goes even further and
states that it offers controls to all users that will enable FedRAMP
compliance and that the cloud storage software is the same for all
users of the service. 146
A different spillover dynamic follows from government tenders
of both private and public cloud services. Consider government
tenders involving private clouds. Here, a cloud company contracts
with the government to create a private cloud storage
infrastructure that only government agencies will use. Recent
private cloud tenders have made headlines in the United States.
Microsoft initially won the bid to create and manage the
Department of Defense’s JEDI Cloud147, which was worth several
billions of dollars from the contract alone.148 Yet in July 2021 the
Department of Defense cancelled the contract noting that it
determined both its needs and the cloud market have changed. The
Department of Defense will now most likely award both Microsoft
and Amazon a multi-cloud/multi-vendor contract.149 Amazon, on
the other hand, was able to secure contracts to provide cloud

144. See AWS Services in Scope by Compliance Program, AMAZON WEB SERVS.,
https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/services-in-scope/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
145. For a listing of Google Cloud products that are FedRAMP compliant, see Google
Cloud Services and Authorized Regions that Are Covered by FedRAMP, GOOGLE CLOUD,
https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/fedramp (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
146. See Trusted Data Protection - Microsoft Online and Professional Services, MICROSOFT
12–13 https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4FhZn (2020);
see also Ask Your Cloud Provider About Compliance, MICROSOFT (2016)
https://download.microsoft.com/download/A/C/5/AC5977D4-A7AE-443A-90994711D143B581/Ask_your_cloud_provider_about_compliance.pdf (“Microsoft enables
compliance in regulated sectors by designing in-scope cloud solutions to meet the
heightened data protection needs of customers dealing with sensitive personal information.
Our technologies support hundreds of controls that enable customers to meet complex
standards and requirements such as ISO 27001 and 27018; SSAE 16 (SOC 1 and SOC 2); E.U.
Model Clauses; HIPAA/HiTrust, including BAAs; FedRAMP; and PCI DSS.”).
147. Jordan Novett, Microsoft Snags Hotly Contested $10 Billion Defense Contract, Beating
Out Amazon, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/25/
microsoft-wins-major-defense-cloud-contract-beating-out-amazon.html.
148. Kate Conger, David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Microsoft Wins Pentagon’s $10 Billion
JEDI Contract, Thwarting Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/25/technology/dod-jedi-contract.html.
149. Lauren Brier & PilieroMazza PLLC, DOD Cancels $10 Billion JEDI Contract, Takes
New Direction on Cloud Procurement, JDSUPRA (July 14, 2021) https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/dod-cancels-10-billion-jedi-contract-3975162/.
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services for other federal agencies.150 Importantly, the value of these
contracts to cloud storage firms exceeds merely the payment itself.
Winning these contracts validates a company’s service in the eyes
of the public and provides a strong signal that these companies
provide robust cloud security.
Recall that Microsoft and Amazon were awarded contracts to
provide private clouds for government uses. Private cloud
contracts promote security spillovers, but some fundamental
features to strengthen the spillover effect are attenuated. In
particular, private clouds only house data provided by the
government, so citizens and private firms do not benefit from
increased security in virtue of having their information on the same
service. However, there are spillovers that result from the
knowledge and expertise that these private cloud storage
companies accumulate when they complete private cloud projects
for the federal government. In particular, cloud storage companies
design and implement state-of-the-art storage services that force
firms to gain valuable knowledge and expertise and help ensure
that their other clients receive adequate security protections. In
addition, firms that are competitive for government contracts will
likely work to make sure that none of their services are breached,
because it may jeopardize their ability to renew government
procurement contracts or receive these contracts initially.
Government usage of public clouds provides more robust
security spillovers than private clouds. In these cases, the
government acquires cloud services that are opened to other nongovernment users, who share the platform with government
agencies. Cloud service providers have strong incentives to ensure
that all clients on the service are sufficiently protected. As a result,
the benefits of assigning a cloud to manage the government’s
information substantially spill over to private companies who
benefit from additional security.
The possibility of using public cloud procurement to promote
security for private companies is not lost on governments. For
example, Israel has planned an ambitious public cloud project

150. Frank Konkel, The Details About the CIA’s Deal with Amazon, ATLANTIC, (July 17,
2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/the-details-about-thecias-deal-with-amazon/374632/ (outlining Amazon’s role in creating a private cloud for
the CIA).
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(NIMBUS)151 that partially justifies the project on the grounds that
Israeli companies (not just the government) stand to benefit. In
the policy documents related to the project, one of the primary
purposes is to promote the use of a secure domestic cloud by
Israeli companies152
There are obvious cybersecurity and national security benefits
to this arrangement. Considering cybersecurity, Israeli companies
benefit from hosting their information on a domestic cloud that
ensures an adequate level of protection. From the vantage point of
national security, there are clear advantages as well. Most notably,
Israel has a clear interest in protecting private company data. This
is particularly true when private companies have information
about private citizens or when companies have valuable
intellectual property. And finally, procuring public cloud storage
shores up a potential national security weakness; that is, the
government has a substantial interest in ensuring that some private
companies remain secure, particularly if these companies hold
information about citizens or even public officials.153
Relying on government procurement and tenders to promote
social objectives (such as cybersecurity) is not without problems. To
start, the tender process might turn political.154 At its worst, this
might lead to selecting cloud providers that do not offer the most
robust security practices, though there is no evidence that this has
occurred. In addition, procurement may not be the most desirable
vehicle to promote social objectives because the process itself is
complicated and lacks robust transparency and accountability
mechanisms for procurement officials.155 Finally, a particularly
151. See Nimbus Tender, GOV’T PROCUREMENT ADMIN., https://mr.gov.il/
ilgstorefront/en/news/details/111222 (Israel).
152. GOV’T ICT AUTHORITY, ISRAEL, POLICY FOR IMPLEMENTING CLOUD COMPUTING IN
GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES, 2020; https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/cloud_policy.
153. We acknowledge Israel’s somewhat unique situation. Because of its geographical
isolation and small size, it cannot attract major cloud operators to set up data hubs as part of
an overall grid. Therefore, the government chose to take specific actions to promote the
development of a privately-owned local cloud. This might be less of a specific concern in the
U.S. and Europe and might explain why these initiatives did not occur there.
154. Aaron Gregg & Jay Greene, Trump Used Pentagon Budget for Personal Gain, Amazon
Alleges, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
12/09/amazon-says-trump-launched-repeated-public-behind-the-scenes-attacks-overmassive-cloud-contract/.
155. Crump, supra note 14 (exploring concerns about transparency and accountability
when policy decisions are pursued through the procurement process).
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competitive bidding process may lead contenders to accept
potential losses on the project in order to gain other advantages.156
In that case, the costs of the heightened security might be rolled
over to the general population of users—a concern we address in
Part III below.
2. Jurisdictional
Additional data security spills across jurisdictional boundaries
as well. At its core, jurisdictional spillovers occur because some
legal regimes mandate higher security standards than others or
threaten harsher penalties for breaches; efforts to comply with these
regulations motivate firms to adopt these heightened regulations
for all of their activities. For instance, a firm may choose to make
sure all its services comply with the stricter jurisdiction rather than
segmenting its services or products.
Consider the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).157 This broad regulatory framework sets
forth stringent data protection obligations that exceed U.S.
federal law.158 Nonetheless, U.S. customers are benefiting from the
European Union’s robust data protection framework. As
explained above, the European Union generates global regulatory
effects, which transcend the continent’s physical borders (aptly
called the “Brussels Effect”).159 The interesting consequence of the
GDPR is that technology firms alter their services to be GDPR
compliant in all jurisdictions in which they operate, not just the
European Union.160
156. Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 810–11.
157. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. L
119/1,
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e485e15-11bd-11e6ba9a-01aa75ed71a1 [hereinafter “GDPR”].
158. Kevin E. Davis & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Regulatory Spillovers: The Case of
GDPR 1 (working paper, on file with authors).
159. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 1.
160. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 137. Note, however, that things might change. Google
and Facebook, for instance, have been reported to consider leaving Australia, given the
prospect of a new law which might force them to pay media companies for content they
publish. Josh Taylor, Will Google and Facebook Really Axe Some Services in Australia and What
Will That Mean?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2021, 5:23 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/
media/2021/jan/31/will-google-search-facebook-in-the-news-axe-services-australia-media-

972

973

Cybersecurity Spillovers

The GDPR stakes out regulatory requirements for data
protection that also include specific data security obligations
backed by substantial fines and sanctions.161 In addition, the GDPR
requires breach notification following the discovery of many
different types of security failures.162 The stringent data security
provisions, aggressive disclosure requirements, and substantial
fine structure create strong incentives for providing robust
security for all users (not just those in the European Union) to
guarantee that a firm’s actions do not contravene the GDPR’s data
security requirements.163
One central reason that the GDPR generates security spillovers
is that firms cannot easily perform regulatory arbitrage to escape its
reach. Rather than regulating firms that are headquartered in the
European Union, which could easily be evaded by shifting a
company’s nation of incorporation, the GDPR regulates how
companies process information about European data subjects.164
This regulatory approach makes evasion particularly difficult.
Importantly, however, the GDPR does not only benefit European
citizens. Rather than partitioning their services according to
territorial jurisdictions, cloud service providers simply apply
GDPR standards in all of their activities, thus creating a significant
security spillover across jurisdictions.
Broadly speaking, multinational technology companies that
store their information in different jurisdictions and process
information about people from many different countries will opt to
comply with the European Union’s data protection regulations.165
code-proposed-law-what-will-that-mean (detailing other instances in which these firms
threatened to leave E.U. countries, such as Spain, Germany and France). Whether this would
indeed occur and whether similar dynamics may unfold in the entire European Union
remains to be seen.
161. GDPR, supra note 157, at Article 32 (stating the requirement to “implement
appropriate technical and organisational measures”). For an example of the harsh sanctions
breaches entail under the GDPR, see id. at Article 83(4)(a).
162. GDPR, supra note 157, at Articles 33–34.
163. Some U.S. state laws also introduce stricter security rules and breach notification
regimes and therefore might be creating limited spillover effects to other states as well. For
an examination of U.S. state laws including data security requirements, see William
McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135 (2019).
164. GDPR, supra note 157, at Article 3(2)(a). For a discussion, see BART VAN DER SLOOT,
THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IN PLAIN LANGUAGE 48–50 (2020). See also
BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 133.
165. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 133.
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This choice is driven by the fact that it is technologically difficult
to segment E.U. and non-E.U. data, and even when it is possible,
the costs and complexity are likely prohibitive.166 Technology
companies’ choice to adopt E.U. regulations as a baseline is
evidenced from a host of examples, largely drawn from outside
data security. For instance, Google has amended various business
practices globally to comply with the GDPR due to Google’s
inability to merely target and cater to E.U.-based customers.167
Similarly, Apple chose to implement some GDPR-related
regulations worldwide, while Facebook reported it would also
do so.168
These findings were recently corroborated by an extensive
empirical study. Kevin Davis and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler
studied changes over time in 194 privacy policies of U.S. internet
companies.169 The study found that almost all firms opted to
substantially amend their policies several weeks before the GDPR
came into effect—a fascinating finding given that these were mostly
firms that offered products and services to U.S. residents.170 The
study indicates the clear influence of the GDPR on a global scale as
reflected in the firms’ contractual language. Given the substantial
implications of non-compliance with
data protection
representations, Davis and Marotta-Wurgler correctly assert that
the effects of the GDPR transcend privacy policies and extend to
changes within a company’s management and IT practices as
well.171 As a result, it is likely that these firms have configured their
data security practices to meet GDPR standards.
Beyond the broader notion of data protection,172 our research
shows that similar assertions regarding the extent of the “Brussels
Effect” could be applied to the data security practices of large cloud
service providers. Indeed, large public cloud providers such as

166. Id. at 143.
167. Id. at 57.
168. Id. at 143.
169. Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 158.
170. Id. at 667–68.
171. Id. at 684–85 (focusing on potential changes required to meet the “data protection
by design” requirements set out by the GDPR, supra note 157, at Article 25).
172. Data protection may be conceptually distinct from data security. See supra note 116
and accompanying text.
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AWS173 and Microsoft Azure advertise and represent that their
systems are in compliance with the GDPR, without distinguishing
between geographical locations.174 Given the substantial risk
of non-compliance with specific yet false representations (which
might come to light if data security lapses and breaches are
revealed), it is fair to assume that users who reside outside of
Europe are receiving the additional cloud security that the
GDPR requires.
In addition, some form of jurisdictional security spillovers is
inevitable in the case of those cloud providers implementing
“shard” models of cloud computing.175 Applying this model is a
reasonable choice for such large and global operations. Global
cloud providers must cope with fluctuations in global demand,
which require that they maintain the ability to divert surplus to
different markets on an ongoing basis.176 With the shard model, and
given the constant and unpredictable movement of data,
international cloud providers must adopt the highest data security
standards at all locations. Thus, the only way cloud providers could
freely shift capacity from the European Union to other global users
and vice versa177 is if the E.U. standards are followed globally,
which generates a spillover to users worldwide.
3. Bargaining power
The underlying logic of security spillovers is that some cloud
clients have unique features or qualities that necessitate higher
security, which then spills over to other clients in the cloud storage
eco-system. One clear example of this dynamic comes from

173. Chad Woolf, All AWS Services GDPR Ready, AWS SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/all-aws-services-gdpr-ready/ (“This announcement
confirms we have completed the entirety of our GDPR service readiness audit, validating
that all generally available services and features adhere to the high privacy bar and data
protection standards required of data processors by the GDPR.”).
174. See Trusted Data Protection – Microsoft Online and Professional Services, supra note
146, at 14 (“The GDPR applies to these organizations no matter where they are located. Given
the GDPR’s broad reach, Microsoft Online Services are designed to help you comply with
the regulation regardless of where you are across the globe.”).
175. See discussion supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
176. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 60–61.
177. Note however, that some services’ locations might not be easily shifted. Email, for
instance, must usually be stored near the user to enable quick retrieval. We thank Steven
Bellovin for this insight.
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differences in bargaining power between clients who make use of
cloud services. Some of these private firms are in a better position
to bargain for heightened security. The differences in bargaining
power between potential clients may result from the amount of
data included in the storage agreement or operations the service
contract will include, so cloud storage companies have the financial
incentives to cater to the specific needs of these clients. However,
smaller clients may benefit from the bargaining power of other
clients on the platform because cloud storage providers have strong
incentives to apply these security measures universally, rather than
partitioning clients into different service tiers.
Many of these consumer agreements between cloud services
and their customers are private and leave us to speculate as to
their existence and details. Yet documents from some large
companies with a strong commitment to transparency—such as
Deutsche TeleKom (DT)—provide us with a glimpse into the
nature of these private agreements. Consider DT’s Information
Security Annex (ISA) which is incorporated into many of DT’s
IT-related agreements.178 The ISA provides detailed requirements
for heightened security clouds that service providers179 must
accept when acting as contractors or service providers for DT. The
ISA makes multiple references to leading security standards
which the provider must apply.180 Contractors must agree to
compliance audits181 as well as to constantly monitor the system
for software vulnerabilities.182 In addition, the ISA includes
obligations regarding the physical security of the cloud facility,
such as monitoring access, as well as restricting remote access
to it.183 Finally, it also addresses the requirement for penetration
tests run by both the contractor and DT184 as well as securing a
178. It is also interesting to note that the ISA requires that all of the “Purchaser data”
stored on a cloud would be “segregated,” yet this does not necessarily mean it would be
moved to a separate location. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, INFORMATION SECURITY ANNEX § G.3, at
7, https://www.telekom.com/resource/blob/568716/5f553ff65de8a731fdca0b7544983bad/
dl-information-security-annex-v3-1-aeb-pdf-data.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
179. The ISA specifically pertains to “deliverables” that include XaaS and Cloud
Services. Id. at 1.
180. See id. at 11 (definitions of “Assets” and “Information Security”).
181. Id. § A.3.
182. Id. § F.
183. Id. § H
184. Id. § I.1.
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disaster plan.185 The fact that other powerful entities with specific
and strict data security preferences partner with the cloud
providers to produce joint service surely drives cloud providers to
ensure that all cloud products provide sufficient security.186
III. THE COMPLICATED CASE FOR SPILLOVERS IN CYBERSECURITY
A. Deeper Dive into Law and Economics of Spillovers
1. Spillovers and formal definitions of externalities
Up to this point, we have used the term “spillover” colloquially
to refer to the additional security measures that basic users gain in
virtue of the relationship between the platform and premium users.
We have avoided using the more technical phrase for spillovers
(positive externalities) in describing these benefits. However,
this lexical move is by design. We have thus far relied on the
basic intuition that some benefit (security) is passed on to basic
users without their request or even knowledge. To that end,
this additional security appears to be an uncompensated benefit
that meets the baseline conditions for a “spillover” in the more
technical sense.
However, the mere fact that additional security measures are
passed to basic users may necessarily constitute a positive
externality. To qualify as a positive externality, a party most likely
should not bear the costs of the additional security that it now
benefits from.
Before discussing the possible entities that could bear the
costs of this additional security, we take a moment to review
some fundamental concepts from law and economics. Our
earlier discussions of externalities failed to note that there are
several distinct types. In particular, externalities can be “technical”

185. Id. § 1.3. Note that it is possible that some of these provisions pertain to the
ordering of software services which are produced on a private network and later run on
DT’s. Yet the detail allows us to appreciate the level of specificity vendors might be required
to answer to.
186. For a description of AWS’s Partner Network, see AWS Partner Network, AWS,
https://aws.amazon.com/partners/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021). For IBM’s partner’s, see IBM
Cloud, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/vn/en/partner-landing.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2021).
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or “pecuniary.”187 Pecuniary externalities describe a situation
where some action (such as opening a nearby Burger King with low
prices) affects the distribution of surplus in a different transaction
(increased competition for burger sales at a nearby McDonald’s).
Here, the value of the service does not change but merely the
distribution of profit between the parties. Typically, economists are
less interested in the distribution of surplus and, by extension, they
are less interested in the policy implications of pecuniary
externalities. Pecuniary externalities, then, are conceptually distinct
from traditional examples of externalities (technical externalities),
such as when a person plants a garden in their yard that increases
home prices in the neighborhood.188
The core of our analysis examines a situation where cloud
providers introduce a higher security standard in response to
certain market pressures. It is possible that the costs of this security
increase are covered by premium users. If platforms are truly
passing the costs of increased security to premium clients, then this
only affects the distribution of surplus—or, rather, the operational
profit from the cloud service—between the two and is a pecuniary
externality. This result is mostly uninteresting to economists
because it only determines the distribution of the pie, rather than
its size.189 According to traditional law and economics scholars, the
important element is that the outcome—in this case the level of
security applied—is efficient. In this Part, we explain why this
“spillover,” which might be merely a pecuniary externality, is
nonetheless interesting (even to the economists!) and beneficial. In
addition, we also sketch other possible designs of this spillover,
including instances where there is, in fact, no externality at all.190

187. James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371
(1962) (offering one of the classical analyses of the distinction between technical and
pecuniary externalities).
188. Id.
189. In other words, the economist does not really care if the extra 100 dollars to cover
the enhanced data security service end up in the pockets of the provider or customer.
190. We set aside the possible option that the situation constitutes a “technical
externality” given the benefits of higher security to many other social segments given its
speculative nature.
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2. Learning and distinguishing from the informed minority theory
Pecuniary positive externalities have been discussed in other
contexts. Consider, for example, the notion of the informed
minority of consumers in standard form contract theory.191 Broadly,
this theory states that if a sufficient number of consumers are
knowledgeable about product prices and attributes,192 firms will
strive to cater to these marginal consumers by assuring that prices
and attributes remain reasonable for all customers.193
According to this hypothesis, firms adhere to the minority’s
preferences across the board to avoid the risk of losing informed
consumers.194 This dynamic will unfold when firms operate in
competitive markets and cannot distinguish ex ante between
informed and uninformed consumers. In these cases, firms are
forced to provide all consumers with reasonable prices and
products.195 These informed consumers essentially become “their
brothers’ keepers.”196 And by doing so, the majority of consumers
benefit from a pecuniary positive externality.197
Comparing cloud storage to standard form contracting
illuminates a crucial distinction. In standard form contracting, the
191. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 678–79 (1979) (for
contractual terms); Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977) (for prices
in general).
192. Id. Importantly, this dynamic includes non-salient contractual provisions in
form contracts.
193. Whether this dynamic occurs in practice is contested, but the discussion of this
popular hypothesis is still illuminating.
194. Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 747 (2009).
195. Here, the product offered is contractual language.
196. The term “brother’s keeper” refers to a seminal article written on this topic. See R.
Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to
Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996) (arguing that a minority of
consumers who read standard form contracts force firms to offer reasonable terms to all
consumers out of fear of losing this minority group of consumers).
197. This argument was also expanded to contractual terms, although recent studies
have rebuked much of this theory. Empirical work demonstrates that there is not a minority
group of consumers that actually reads standard form contracts and, further, no one knows
what the contractual provisions actually mean. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler
& David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) (noting that only a very small fraction of online
consumers access end-user license agreements and fewer read any significant portion of it).
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vendor is unable to distinguish between “informed” and
“uninformed” users. Therefore, firms must offer products that are
uniform in both form (including the contractual language) and
price. Once a vendor can differentiate between different kinds of
customers, the externality can be internalized by the firm. That is,
the firm can customize a price, contract, and product for every
customer and, as a result, the uninformed customers are no longer
protected by the wisdom of the informed ones.198
With cloud providers, the challenge is quite different. Cloud
providers may be able to price different consumers differently. But
they are still unable to provide them with different products given
the services’ indivisibility. The ability to differentiate in price—but
not service—leads to unique outcomes where the “spillover”
dynamic might not create pecuniary externalities—or even an
externality at all. Therefore, the data security context generates a
unique dynamic that needs to be explored more fully.
In the next three sections, we discuss three different scenarios
that focus on who bear the cost of providing additional security.
This analysis allows us to understand whether the security spills
within cybersecurity are normatively desirable and sets the stage
for some policy considerations in Part IV. In addition, mapping the
complexity of these different models allows us to see the general
theory of spillovers in a new light. We concede that the discussion
is somewhat abstract. Comparing payment flows is almost
impossible because it requires access to pricing and operations
information protected by trade secrecy and confidentiality
agreements. Therefore, we model three different—and arguably
conclusive—scenarios regarding potential pricing schemes with
the hope that future empirical work will provide more details about
pricing distributions. The actual model that would unfold in
practice would depend on several unknown factors such as the
market power of the various entities, information asymmetries, and
transaction costs.199

198. We are possibly already moving in this direction. See generally Ariel Porat &
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 1417 (2014) (arguing that big data techniques can be used to tailor default and
disclosure rules to specific individuals and claiming that the effects of customization are
generally desirable).
199. ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 78, at 84.
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B. Traditional Spillover Situation (Higher Prices for
Premium Customers)
We begin with the most intuitive—though potentially naïve—
scenario. Here, the cloud provider responds to the request to
provide the premium users with a more secure and costly service
by increasing the price that premium clients pay. In other words,
the specific agreements between cloud providers and premium
users will be priced higher, in virtue of the additional service. The
price for basic users, however, remains stable. This dynamic can be
seen in Illustration I.

ILLUSTRATION I
It is also fair to speculate that these additional costs will be
borne by the premium users’ customers: for example, bank account
holders if the premium user is a bank. Alternatively, if the premium
user is a political or governmental entity (such as the Department
of Defense, or a governmental research institution), these costs will
be rolled over to the relevant constituents. Finally, at times, specific
premium users—or users from selected jurisdictions which set
higher security standards—might be unable to roll over the costs,
and therefore the costs will be borne by the firm’s shareholders or
the premium client (consider a private hedge fund, or merely an
E.U.-based entity or person subject to the GDPR).
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This dynamic coupled with the flow of payments involved
might suggest that the premium clients are cross subsidizing the
basic ones.200 In this scenario, a portion of the basic users’ costs is
covered by the additional costs borne by the premium users.
Furthermore, given the premium users’ ability to roll these costs
over, it might be the broader groups of citizens or customers who
are, in fact, providing the subsidy. In some cases, these might be
other basic users who receive these premium services for a price. In
others, they might be citizens and users in a different jurisdiction
(we pick this point back up momentarily).
Normatively, many would not find the fact that some firms are
paying—and providing a subsidy—for the data security benefits of
others undesirable, especially given their ability to spread these
costs across a large population. The fact that data security amounts
to a public good might indeed support the position that the price
for a fundamental service—which provides broad positive
externalities—such as data security should be borne by the entire
population and premium users are best positioned to shoulder this
burden and spread its associated costs (especially when this is
a government!).
This aspect of the discussion mirrors the existing literature on
externalities in both data security and infrastructure. Within data
security, scholars have identified the possibility and determinants
of positive externalities and recommended subsidies to offset
potential problems (typically underproduction).201 The principal
worry with positive externalities is that these goods will be
underproduced because the public benefits outweigh the private
ones. Here, a likely recommendation from law and economics
minded policy analysts is for the government to offer subsidies to
200. Cross subsidization occurs when a firm charges inflated prices to one set of
customers and artificially lower prices to another set of customers. See Kenneth Fjell, A CrossSubsidy Classification Framework 21 J. PUB. POL’Y. 265 (2001) (defining cross subsidization); see
also John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden
Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018) (describing how cross-subsidies can be more efficient
than taxes at redistributing wealth).
201. In other contexts, however, regulators respond to positive externalities by
providing subsidies to the entities providing excess capacity or choosing to meet higher
security standards. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1503, 1519 (2013); see also Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to Network Threats: The Evolution
into Private Cybersecurity Associations, LAW AND ECON. OF CYBERSECURITY 143, 149 (Mark F.
Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) [cited by Derek Bambauer] (discussing the proposal to
provide subsidies to firms that provide positive security externalities).
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premium users to ensure that they continue to demand higher
levels of security even though they do not internalize a substantial
segment of the benefits. The thinking here is that the subsidy
increases the private benefits of high-level cloud storage for
premium users to match the social benefits that arise from the
spillover of heightened security.
However, it is not entirely obvious that subsidies are justified
in this case. This is largely because premium users may pass on the
costs of the service and because it is unlikely these premium users
will no longer demand higher security standards without a
subsidy. As a result, a subsidy may not be needed to ensure that
high security cloud storage is produced optimally. And further, the
rejection of subsidies in this scenario resembles conclusions by
infrastructure scholars who note that infrastructure merits unique
regulatory approaches and that particular remedies (here,
subsidies) may be unnecessary and undesirable.202
Another complication for the normative analysis of premium
users bearing the costs of spillovers is that some spillovers are
jurisdictional. That is, premium users in one country may be
subsidizing basic users in another country and, by extension,
helping to improve that country’s data security baseline. In fact, it
is highly likely that E.U. firms and citizens are subsidizing
additional cloud security measures for U.S. citizens.203 This result is
likely considered a reasonable sacrifice by E.U. member states but
should be included in political discussions regarding the
consequences of existing and future regulation in the European
Union.204 In any event, it underlies the difficulty of using subsidies
when externalities unfold as part of cross-border activities.205
C. Price Adjustment as Solving a Market Failure
Let us consider another scenario. Here, cloud providers adjust
the costs of the service to reflect the additional security made
available to all customers. In other words, storage providers raise
prices for basic users to mirror the services they receive (as opposed
202. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 73, at 108 (explaining why the conventional solution
of government subsidizing production are undesirable when concerning infrastructure).
203. BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 89 (mentioning the possibility that various nations
world-wide are “free riding” on the E.U.’s efforts).
204. Id. at 97 (noting that that all citizens are potentially sharing the benefits).
205. ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 78, at 88.
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to the service bargained for). Here, the “spillover” discussed cannot
be considered a positive externality. This is because basic users are
paying higher prices and internalizing the benefits of their more
secure service.206 It is a spillover only in the colloquial sense that
additional security is passed from premium to basic users. This
dynamic can be seen in Illustration II.

Cloud
Provider

Basic Users

Premium Users

ILLUSTRATION II
Even if there is not necessarily an externality in this scenario, it
is worthy of analysis. Rather than an externality, this situation
could be described as remedying a market failure within data
security. The most glaring market failure in security is that
individuals undervalue their security needs and firms
underprovide adequate security. The “spillover” dynamic pushes
the market towards a more efficient point of equilibrium because it
ensures that less security-sensitive clients still receive adequate
security. As a result, even if the costs of additional security are fully

206. The fact that these “basic users” exercise a higher degree of security might be
creating positive externalities of its own, but this goes beyond the scope of our analysis.
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internalized by basic users, it is sound policy to promote this
security spillover.207
D. Cross-Subsidization (No Traditional Spillover)
The final possible scenario stems from the importance that
cloud operators place on retaining premium users. Therefore, it is
quite possible that premium clients will not be charged any
additional cost for the enhanced service they receive. Given the
importance of winning these important clients, the cloud providers
may treat them as “loss leaders” and charge relatively low prices to
these clients to entice them to use their service. The intuition here
is that premium clients are essential for cloud storage firms because
these firms routinely advertise by publicizing which security
conscious clients pay for their service (such as the Department of
Defense208 and similar private companies) or any other large client
they retained.209

207. Bradford takes a somewhat different approach to this scenario. She notes that
perhaps the prices are raised for all clients but meeting the higher E.U. regulatory standards
is a form of “regulatory paternalism” which nudges individuals towards an optimal decision
that takes future and hidden costs into account, and thus is optimal. BRADFORD, supra note
10, at 238.
208. Jon Palmer, It Bid High and Lost. Should Amazon Be Allowed a Do-Over on JEDI?,
MICROSOFT BLOG (Apr. 15, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/04/15/
dod-amazon-jedi-contract/.
209. For instance, Microsoft signed a substantial agreement with Walmart. See Vanessa
Ho, A New Walmart ‘Cloud Factory’ Will Accelerate Digital Innovation, Boost Business Efficiency,
MICROSOFT NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://news.microsoft.com/transform/new-walmartcloud-factory-innovation-business-efficiency/.
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In order to recoup the loses that follow from undercharging
premium clients, cloud providers may choose to overcharge basic
users to make up the difference. This is possible because basic users
are likely to be unaware of the actual costs of cloud storage and less
likely to choose a service based on a transparent bidding process.
And further, cloud storage is inelastic—meaning that firms still
need to purchase cloud storage even when the price rises—so basic
users may not be responsive to additional costs. That is, even if the
cost of the service is raised, basic users are still likely to retain the
service (to which they might have even got themselves locked
into).210 This dynamic can be seen in Illustration III.
Cloud
Provider

Basic Users

Premium Users

ILLUSTRATION III
In this scenario, the “spillover” is merely an illusion. Yet even
in this case, the market failure that leads to suboptimal security is
remedied because basic users are still receiving increased security.
However, they are the ones who are paying the costs of this
additional service. The central problem here arises from the crosssubsidy that occurs when basic users subsidize cloud storage for

210. Steven M. Bellovin, Hearing Before the New York City Council Committee on
Technology: Cloud Computing and Storage, 1, 9–10 (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.cs.columbia.edu/
~smb/papers/nyc-cloud.pdf.
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large firms.211 Put differently, basic users are internalizing the costs
of their service and the additional costs of benefits that accrue to
premium clients.
At bottom, basic user’s cross-subsidization of premium clients’
services is a double-edged sword. It is positive because it remedies
the market failure of security and ensures that basic clients and
premium clients receive robust security protections. However, it is
normatively undesirable because it transfers wealth from smaller
players towards large corporations. Yet regulatory responses can
combat this problem by providing a subsidy to basic users to offset
the additional costs that they bear, or consumer protection agencies
(such as the FTC) can monitor for potential cross-subsidies and
intervene appropriately.212
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CYBERSECURITY SPILLOVERS
The previous sections set out to address the mechanics of
security spillovers, including a description of features that lead to
their emergence as well as potential ambiguities about who bears
the cost of this additional layer of security. This discussion also
explored externalities generally as well as conceptual difficulties
surrounding externalities in cybersecurity and how this connects to
ideas pertaining to infrastructure. At bottom, security spillovers
resolve market failures in data security by providing higher levels
of security to users who may lack the power, knowledge or
resources to assure they receive it. In this section, we focus
specifically on potential policy proposals that attend to these
spillovers; often these proposals will promote spillovers, but other
interventions are aimed at shifting the costs of additional security
measures. The policy analysis that follows is uniquely important
given the ever-changing terrain of the business of cloud computing,

211. However, even if premium users are paying for the costs of additional security,
they may be able to pass on these costs to their customers (who are likely basic users). If
premium users can pass these costs to basic security users, then the scenario mirrors the
cross-subsidy case where basic users are subsidizing security services for premium users.
212. See Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission,
Potential Cross-Subsidization, 1, 2–3 (Sept. 25, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-federal-communicationscommission-concerning-wireline-service-offerings-advanced/v980030.pdf (discussing ways
in which regulators can track such cross subsidies).
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the strategy of cloud procurement, and the regulation of data
security both locally and globally.
Beyond these broader themes, our policy discussion is
particularly relevant today because of recent debates over the
regulation of large technology firms currently offering the leading
cloud services (such as Amazon via AWS or Microsoft via Azure),
which include proposals to break up these companies.213
Importantly, security spillovers are partially a product of
concentration, so regulatory efforts that break up cloud storage
may also undermine these beneficial dynamics. For instance, if
cloud storage services are broken up along territorial lines, then
American users will not necessarily benefit from the advantage that
comes from sharing a service with European users who are
protected by the regulatory floor set by the GDPR.
We do not take a position on whether breaking up big
technology companies is a viable or even desirable regulatory
response. Instead, we offer a roadmap to regulators that describes
how the benefits of concentration can be preserved without actual
concentration. In other words, our policy proposals will offer some
general remarks about how security spillovers can be maximized
generally and preserved in the case that regulators choose to
disband some of the larger technology companies.
Our analysis in this section offers two central modes to promote
spillover effects: manipulating the underlying features that cause
security spillovers and specific policy choices that are external to
the basic features of spillovers, particularly the role that
government procurement serves in promoting security spillovers.
A. Strengthening Spillovers Through Their Features
Recall that security spillovers depend on three dominant
factors, (1) the level of security offered to premium clients, (2)
different types of indivisibility that force security to spill over to
additional clients, and (3) market concentration which bundles
premium and basic users together within the same brand, service,
and platform. With an eye on the constituent elements of security

213. See Khan, supra note 13; see also Mark MacCarthy, The House Antitrust Report Is
a Major Step Toward Reining in Big Tech, BROOKINGS (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/10/20/the-house-antitrust-report-is-amajor-step-toward-reining-in-big-tech/.
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spillovers, policymakers can tinker with these underlying features
to increase the strength of the spillover.
1. Security floors for premium clients
The analysis of spillovers identifies several motivations for
premium users to demand and receive greater data security
protections. Regulatory interventions could target the motivations
or market power of premium users to push them towards
demanding greater protections or being in a better position to have
their demands of additional security universally met by cloud
service providers.
Most obviously, a comprehensive data security law that
emanates from a large country with significant market share could
push the global security market towards offering higher levels of
security. Importantly, the effects of this legislation would be
compounded by storage and sharing techniques that employ a data
shard model. This is largely because shard models of cloud
computing and storage move and store data across jurisdictional
lines. As a result, shard models make user segmentation much
more difficult, so the effects of a country’s robust data security
regime are more likely to be the de facto floor for all users, especially
when segmentation is not feasible.
Whether the European Union, the United States, or any other
global super-economy should promote broad legislation is a
question that transcends the scope of our analysis and requires a
detailed examination of diplomatic pressures and broader political
economy issues. We cautiously note, though, that even within
a federal system (such as the United States) a single state law
that promotes a relatively high level of security can potentially
generate substantial spillovers, which will improve data security
in other areas beyond that individual state, especially if that state
has significant market power214 or influence.215 This possibility
214. Indeed, some commentators have speculated companies may adopt California’s
consumer privacy law for their operations in the entire United States, see Jessica Guynn,
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2020: What the New Privacy Law Means to You, USA TODAY
(Dec. 30, 2019, 7:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/12/27/californiaprivacy-law-could-help-all-americans-protect-their-data/2700206001/.
215. For a discussion of state data security rules, see McGeveran, supra note 163. For an
example of recent state law (New York) to this effect, see An Act to Amend the General

989

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

may provide strong reasons against a US federal data security
law which may preempt states laws and, by extension, curtail the
state’s ability to set high security requirements which exceed a
federal standard.216
Another possible regulatory lever to raise the security floor is
government procurement. Although the next section details how
the government contracting process can be used to promote
spillovers, a few details are worth mentioning here. To start,
scholars have remarked that IT procurement is a valuable tool to
regulate software and lament that government agencies have not
used the procurement process more effectively in this regard.217
Indeed, procurement could enhance overall security by setting high
data security standards. Further, and somewhat counterintuitively,
the government contracting process as whole can promote overall
data security if sensitive government data is shared or stored on
public clouds alongside data from private firms. To that end,
procurement decisions by the federal government should explore
the internal features of cloud vendors and partially base decisions
on whether the government contract will foster additional security.
Finally, other regulatory measures could incentivize private
firms to negotiate strict security standards. Even if regulators are
unable to broadly supervise entire industries, they might not need
to do so. Enforcing against a small number of players who will use
public clouds might be sufficient to generate substantial spillover.
These might be leading IT firms, financial services, or other entities
providing key services. Therefore, potential regulation could come
from various regulatory agencies such as financial and banking

Business Law and the State Technology Law, in relation to notification of a security breach,
S5575B, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bills/2019/s5575/amendment/b.
216. For a related discussion regarding privacy law generally and the question as to
whether it should be governed by state laws, or preempted by federal law, see Paul M.
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009); Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of
Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 595 (2016) (noting the benefits of competing
state laws). But see Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J.
868 (2009) (arguing for federal preemption of state privacy law).
217. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2019).
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regulators including the FTC,218 SEC,219 or any other state or federal
financial regulator. In other words, the spillover intuition leads us
to appreciate the logic of focusing regulatory attention on specific
high-profile entities, which will influence others to follow. Again,
regulatory standards should also consider a lenient approach
towards embracing public clouds, given their role in generating
desirable spillovers.
2. Enhancing indivisibility
As explained earlier, much of the cloud industry is indivisible
by nature. However, security best practices often dictate that
systems are compartmentalized and made divisible. Keeping
systems apart, even “air-gapping” them,220 is important to limit
the migration of malicious code and viruses from one
contaminated area to another. Therefore, policy recommendations
should certainly not promote technical indivisibility—which comes
at the cost of overall security in the network. Other forms of
indivisibility could still be promoted through regulatory tweaks
which would promote spillovers while also avoiding new
security vulnerabilities.
Consider liability indivisibility—the liability which might follow
from the inadvertent comingling of data which was subjected to
security-based contractual and regulatory requirements. Here,
liability might arise from the terms of a contractual agreement
between data storage providers and their clients. Yet it might also
result from the legal standards set in place by courts or legislators
to govern the liability of both cloud service providers and their
customers. For instance, if a specific set of premium users are
governed by strict liability standards, they will respond by
demanding that their vendors apply higher security standards
across the board. However, it is possible that cloud providers will
implement these changes on their own accord given the risks of
218. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) plays an active role in promoting
cybersecurity goals. In particular, the FTC undertakes a variety of enforcement actions under
its Section 5 authority as well as under authority granted by the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act.
See Privacy & Security Enforcement, FTC https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement.
219. Nathaniel Sobel, The SEC and Cybersecurity Regulation, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sec-and-cybersecurity-regulation.
220. See supra notes 123–125 (describing air gapping).
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secondary liability for these breaches.221 This logic would lead to
similar effects for legal rules that impose substantial damages for
breaches, which would differ from the current uncertainty that
surrounds a plaintiff’s ability to succeed in a lawsuit for damages
arising from a breach incident.
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between at least two sets
of relevant legal rules. First, consider the standard of conduct that
generates liability—which may be the traditional negligence
standard or strict liability. Broader liability rules—such as strict
liability—enhance the prospect of risk and incentivize broadening
the application of stricter security rules.222
Second, legal rules also determine the severity of damages
courts will be willing to award. If courts uphold liquidated
damages for security breaches, or award high damages for those
affected by the breach, the intensity of this dynamic will grow. The
extent of damages will also depend on the interpretation of existing
doctrines that determine whether collateral damage can be
compensated—as it stands, these damages are currently
uncompensated in most jurisdictions.223 Both sets of rules are
equally efficient legal levers which could enhance the spillover
dynamic. In other words, setting strict liability rules, and finding
large damages when firms that hold sensitive data (such as
financial institutions) are breached, might enhance security
spillovers to the basic users who are otherwise outside the scope of
broader litigation rights.
Bringing legal action against cloud providers by their users is
not an easy task. The users face substantial hurdles when making a
case for negligence as almost all the information (such as the
relevant logins) related to the event is held by the platform which
they are accusing of wrongdoing. Similarly, the cloud service
providers will strive to limit their liability initially by inserting
221. Perhaps cloud providers will be incentivized to take these steps on their own.
222. For a discussion of different liability standards in cyber security, see Verstraete &
Zarsky, supra note 130, at 834–39. See also Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The
Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241
(2007); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005).
223. For a discussion of the challenges of economic loss doctrine and cybersecurity, see
Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule? 66 DEPAUL L.
REV. 339 (2017) and David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss
Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935 (2016).
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provisions into their terms of use that discount potential liability.
Therefore, the current state of affairs may demonstrate that the
hardship of bringing successful cases undermines the potential
deterrence effect that the threat of legal action typically generates
in other areas. If this is the case, regulators must step into this void
and act against these entities. In addition, these difficulties are yet
another reason why strict liability rules might be preferable in
some contexts.
Reputational indivisibility can also be enhanced by regulatory
levers that govern disclosure measures, rather than through
liability measures. For instance, enabling switching between cloud
providers at a reasonable cost will assure the firm’s ongoing
interest in its reputation. In addition, breach notification laws are a
central mechanism to educate the public about breaches of cloud
operators. Yet the flow of information regarding breaches is far
from perfect. The current law does not, in most cases, provide
information to other users of the platform, but only to data subjects
affected by the breach and regulatory authorities.224 Therefore,
reputation-related information might not flow to premium
customers alerting them of failings within the infrastructure that
protects basic users on the platform. This information barrier
would undermine the potential for substantial spillovers because it
insulates cloud providers from reputational sanctioning on behalf
of premium clients. To enhance the flow of reputational
information, information about events occurring on cloud services
must be communicated to the broader public, or at least to users of
the same platform.
If cloud providers introduce different brands for various tiers
of cloud services (which lead back to separate corporate entities)
then regulators will face a substantial challenge notifying clients
that are using the same services but through different brands or
corporate structures. However, secondary information flows
from the media and other sources may inform users of “sister”
cloud brands of the breaches occurring in the other companies but
within the same corporate structure. Again, broader notifications

224. Verstraete & Zarsky, supra note 130, at 838–39.
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schemes to regulators and the press might improve the possibility
of spillovers.225
3. Spillovers, concentration, and size
Finally, consider the somewhat complicated relationship
between the strength of potential spillovers and the cloud
operator’s size. To some extent, spillovers are correlated with the
size of a firm. The arguments for potential spillovers may prove
very weak or even irrelevant for small data centers which house
data for a handful of local, homogenous clients. In these cases, the
firm might be insulated from external pressures if it has no
international, or governmental contracts.226 By contrast, the
possibility of spillovers grows dramatically for larger entities
with a more diverse portfolio of customers—and in any event,
these will be the firms that set the high standards the entire industry
will follow.
The relationship between firm size and spillovers is most
relevant for some of the key players of cloud storage, which also
happen to be large technology firms (such as Amazon, Google, and
Microsoft). Because of their large customer base and multinational
presence, these large firms are particularly amenable to the external
pressures that create spillovers. In addition, these firms are actively
competing for the most lucrative government contracts, which
opens up an additional area of potential intervention and influence
over these companies.
The inescapable reality is that the dominant cloud providers are
the same multi-national technology firms which acquired vast
wealth, power, and influence. The calls for their breakup have been
growing stronger and require an analysis of these proposals in view
of their influence on security spillovers.227 To start, merely
separating the cloud services from other businesses offered by large
technology firms would not have much (if any) effect of the
spillover ecosystem. For example, separating Microsoft’s operating
system, Google’s search and email, and Amazon’s retail from the
225. For the important role the media plays in the flows of information regarding
breaches, see Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007).
226. Though small firms may face pressure to meet the standards their larger
competitors set.
227. See Khan, supra note 13.
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respective firm’s cloud operation would not compromise the
production of spillovers.
Critics may further argue that the cloud operations of these
firms are themselves too big and must be split apart as well. When
considering regulatory interventions against the size of these
companies, antitrust and competition regulators should also
consider how changes may complicate existing spillover dynamics.
For instance, if regulators choose to force a large cloud company to
operate through several different ones—or even siphon off parts of
the operation—then regulators should be sensitive to how these
changes could diminish desirable spillovers of security.
Here, we offer several policy recommendations. First,
regulators should ensure that each newly formed “baby” cloud
provider is obliged and permitted to retain high-profile premium
users.228 This creates diversity among the potential clients of the
new provider and allows security measures to spill from premium
to basic users.
Second, the newly formed firms should be allowed and perhaps
incentivized to retain a mix of domestic and international clients.
Again, a mixture of users that must comply with different legal
requirements can create additional security gains when firms
simply adopt the most stringent regulatory system across the
platform. By following these two simple proposals, regulators
could gain the benefits of breaking up large technology companies
while also retaining the benefits of concentration even without
concentration itself.
B. Strengthening Spillovers Through Government Contracts
The procurement and governmental tender processes
potentially play a pivotal role in promoting data security spillovers.
The narrow (and incorrect) view of procurement is that it focuses
exclusively on monetary considerations. On this view, the vendor
that offers the best service at the lowest cost will inevitably receive
the contract to provide their services to the government. Yet this is
not the case. Federal procurement law is sensitive to a host of non-

228. This term is borrowed from the dynamic of creating several independent firms
which control a specific market segment as a result of a divesting ownership by a monopoly.
See Hiba Hafiz, Rethinking Breakups, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 35),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3892326.
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monetary objectives and has correctly been used to promote a
divergent set of social policies.229 For instance, federal procurement
law is sensitive to social issues such as equal employment
opportunity, labor standards, environmental protection, and
preference for historically disadvantaged groups. Indeed, in the
past there have been numerous attempts to promote these goals
through the procurement process itself.230 Given the capacious set
of values that are embedded in procurement decisions as well as
tender processes, using them to promote data security spillovers is
a reasonable policy measure,231 which could be implemented in
several distinct ways.232 And while the procurement process might
present difficulties given the need to balance between very
different needs on an ongoing basis, the tender process might be a
better fit for promoting cybersecurity spillovers. This process
provides the government with a greater flexibility to exercise its
authority at a specific juncture, particularly where it could apply
any expertise it receives from other sources.
First, procurement and tender decisions could give preference
to companies that are likely to generate substantial spillovers. For
instance, the government could prioritize cloud companies that
offer services to basic users as well as premium ones. By awarding
a contract to a cloud storage firm that has many—or even more than
its competitors—basic users, the government can use its
procurement process to ensure additional security protections for
these clients that may not have adequate security but for the fact
that they happen to share a service with a government agency.
Conversely, if a company that only offered services to premium
clients received a government contract, then there may not be much
additional security created because the firm’s premium clients
already negotiated for robust security protections. In this situation
229. Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 797–99.
230. Id.
231. For a general discussion as to the use of the government’s power as a substantial
market player (or “superuser”), see Eldar Haber & Amnon Reichman, The User, the Superuser,
and the Regulator: Functional Separation of Powers and the Plurality of the State in Cyber, 35
BERKELEY. TECH. L. J. 431, 482–86, 480–91 (2020).
232. The Government is already using procurement to promote data security in the
context of IoT. Consider H.R. 1668 116th Cong. Internet of Things (2020) (enacted).
Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/1668/text (stating that federal agencies will not be able to procure
devices that do not meet the relevant NIST requirements).
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the bidding vendor may be required to meet a baseline threshold of
basic users.
Second, the government could prioritize promoting spillovers
in tenders by awarding contracts to multiple vendors rather than a
single one,233 (as the Israeli regulator chose to do with its NIMBUS
project).234 Awarding a government contract to several different
cloud providers could generate substantial spillover effects for
several reasons. This is because of the inherent indivisibility of the
reputation of cloud service providers. If multiple firms are
potentially competing for lucrative government contracts, then
each will have to be particularly careful not to have any security
incidents that jeopardize their possibility of winning these
contracts. This extra caution will also benefit basic users of the same
service because—as we discussed previously—security incidents
that only involve basic users’ information may still diminish the
brand’s reputation.235
In addition, awarding government contracts to multiple firms
will potentially lead to improvements in the knowledge resources
of cloud service operators that may benefit the firms’ other clients.
Consider the DoD’s initial contentious decision to award the JEDI
project—a multibillion dollar contract to create cloud storage
systems for the United States Department of Defense—to
Microsoft. Our central recommendation here is that the
government recognize that it could enhance security generally by
improving the knowledge infrastructure of multiple firms rather
than a single one. Indeed, the government’s recent decision to
cancel the JEDI contract and replace it with a multi-cloud/multivendor contract might be a step in the right direction236 Yet, in
fairness, it is possible that the reason for this decision by the
233. See Murli Thirumale, Why the Pentagon’s Single-Source JEDI Cloud Contract
Would Be a Mistake For Any Large Business, HILL (May 4, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/442073-why-the-pentagons-single-source-jedicloud-contract-would-be-a-mistake-for.
234. Ela Levi-Weinrib & Uri Berkovitz, Amazon and Google Win Israel’s Nimbus Cloud
Tender, GLOBES (Apr. 21, 2021), https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-amazon-and-google-winisraels-nimbus-cloud-tender-1001368335 (indicating that both Amazon and Google were
awarded the NIMBUS tender for the governmental cloud, although the reason for this
decision was most likely to promote resilience).
235. Importantly, the same dynamics will occur after winning a government contract
out of fear that a security incident that only affects basic users will still tarnish the firm’s
reputation and jeopardize the possibility of any contract extension.
236. See Brier & PilieroMazza, supra note 149.
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government was related to claims of unfair pressure to disfavor
AWS, which was motivated by political pressure from the White
House at the time and had little to do with the thesis we developed
here.237 Of course, the decision to award a contract to multiple firms
has a varied cost/benefit calculus including delicately balancing
resilience and complexity as well as understanding potential
problems of interoperability that arise from multiple companies
working together to create a cloud infrastructure for the same
governmental agency (regardless of its vast size). However, we—
and several major cloud companies—find that these other
considerations do not wholly exclude the possibility of awarding
contracts to multiple companies and that this decision could lead to
security gains in other areas through spillovers.
The discussion above maps out several bold policy
recommendations. However, there is one caveat within our policy
prescriptions. Even though the cloud operators are (often
inadvertently) carrying out an essential public service by
enhancing overall data security, there is no apparent reason to
compensate them for that, either directly or indirectly. This
conclusion follows from the literature regarding spillovers and
externalities which we find highly relevant to this context as well.238
CONCLUSION: SPILLOVERS OF SPILLOVERS
In this Article, we cast light on unrecognized positive
externalities—or “cybersecurity spillovers”—within cloud
computing systems. If appropriately incentivized by policymakers,
these security spillovers may offset the problems of negative
externalities and market failure that undermine a robust
cybersecurity regime.
As we discussed, the additional security benefits that flow
unregulated through cloud storage platforms are grounded in the
technical, legal, and social factors that constitute data security. In
particular, the ease with which information spreads facilitates
reputational sanctioning and gives regulators an effective tool to

237. See Diane Bartz & David Shepardson, Pentagon Hits Reset on Trump’s $10bln Cloud
Deal, Welcoming New Players, REUTERS (July 7, 2021, 4:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
technology/pentagon-scraps-jedi-award-microsoft-will-rebid-2021-07-06/.
238. See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 69, at 299–300 (explaining that
externalities are not always a problem which requires solving, such as assuring internalization).
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influence decisions by cloud storage companies. Similarly,
malicious code slips seamlessly across systems, defying air-gaps
and other technical barriers. These factors render systems de facto
indivisible and force cloud storage platforms to ensure adequate
protections across their entire service. And further, regulators can
adjust these features that promote indivisibility to amplify the
beneficial effects of security spillovers.
Our analysis in this Article may proceed in several different
directions. First, we should empirically examine the extent of
security spillovers that are currently occurring within cloud storage
platforms. And further, policymakers should experiment with
different regulatory levers to promote spillovers in cases where
they are most needed. A continued focus on examining and
promoting spillovers is necessary because the terrain of cloud
computing is ever-changing; new cloud computing firms will likely
attempt to distinguish themselves by offering new technological
tools and unique security tiers, which may disrupt the flow of
additional security protections throughout these platforms.
Second, the underlying logic that supports spillovers in
cybersecurity does not entirely depend on the specifics of the
technical and social elements that comprise cloud computing or
cybersecurity. The analysis should branch out to other contexts
where similar beneficial spillovers can be discovered and
promoted. One potential area of focus is machine learning, which
may also permit spillover effects. More specifically, algorithmic
tools may produce harmful biases whenever these tools are trained
on biased data. Rather than focusing on the outputs of algorithms,
regulators should focus on the inputs and, in particular, the central
repositories where training data is generated. Just as concentration
for cloud storage promote spillovers, concentration in the sources
of training data creates an easier point of entry for regulators. When
regulators de-bias one of these central repositories of data, the
beneficial effects will spillover across various contexts and produce
fairer results wherever this de-biased data is used.
Cybersecurity spillovers present an opportunity to generate
and enhance security for all users, while benefiting from the
preferential treatment premium users might be receiving. If
policymakers leverage the indivisibility and diversity aspects of
cybersecurity to take advantage of these spillovers, we may yet see
a more secure future for cloud computing and the internet in general.
999

